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RECENT CASES
Bar Admissions-The Character Investigation as an Unconstitutional Scheme to Promote Conformity: Comment on
LSCRRC v. Wadmond
In a combined class action, law students, organizations of law
students,' and applicants to the bar 2 sought to invalidate3 by injunctive
and declaratory relief' certain sections of the statutory scheme and
regulations5 governing admissions to the New York Bar. The bar
admission standards were administered by the defendants, members of
the Committee on Character and Fitness of Applicanits for Admission
to the Bar of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
York in the First and Second Judicial Departments.6 Plaintiffs alleged
that the statutory scheme, and specifically pertain rules 7 and quesI. The Law Student's Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. (LSCRRC) is a non-profit
membership corporation composed of approximately 1,500 law students from 60 law schools
throughout the country. Its principal objectives involve non-partisan research and active
participation in the areas of civil rights and civil liberties. Second Amended Complaint for
Plaintiff at 2-3, Law Student's Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 299 F. Supp.
117 (S.D.N.Y. f969). The Columbia Law Student's Guild and the New York City Chapter of
the National Lawyer's Guild include law students and applicants to the bar at Columbia
University School of Law and various law schools in New York City. Both organizations seek
the protection and fostering of civil rights and liberties by active engagement in these fields. 299
F. Supp. at 140.
2. These individuals have taken and passed the written examination required of all applicants for admission to the New York Bar. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 464 (McKinney 1968).
3. Plaintiffs invoked the court's jurisdiction,' Judiciary Act of 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1964), to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964): "Every person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress." A three-judge court was convened pursuant to Judiciary
Act of 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
4. Judiciary Act of 1948, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1964) provide for declaratory and further
relief.
5. Admission to the bar is governed by minimal standards which are established by the
legislature and applied through court prescribed rules and questionnaires. See note 60 infra.
6. The State of New York is divided by law into four judicial departments. N.Y. CONST.
art. 6, § 4; N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 90 (McKinney 1968). The rules and questions of the first
and second departments regarding admission are functionally identical. N.Y.R. Civ. PRAc. 9401,
9404 provide for the appointment of a character committee for each judicial district in a
department by the respective appellate division and authorize these committees to prescribe
questionnaires.
7. Plaintiffs focused their challenge on N.Y.R. Civ. PRAC. 9406, infra note 62. Other rules
relevant to the statutory scheme include: RULES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ADMISSION

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23

tions8 formulated to ascertain whether the applicant possesses the
character and general fitness requisite for an attorney, were un-

constitutional'

on

their

face

and

as

applied."

Defendants

denied that the statutes and their implementation were unconsti-

tutional and claimed that the New York judiciary had autonomous
control over the selection of its officers." The District Court for the
Southern District of New York, held, injunction denied. The statutory
scheme governing admissions to the New York Bar did not violate the
fourteenth amendment, but certain rules and questions implementing
the statutes were vague and overbroad and thus violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 229 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
After control over the legal profession had been established by the

judiciary,"2 the Civil War spawned wartime legislation regulating the
loyalty of the profession.1 3 In Ex parte Garland," a member of the

OF ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS-AT-LAW, published as an appendix to N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW
Rule ViiI-1 (McKinney 1968): "Every applicant for admission to the Bar must produce before
a Committee on Character and Fitness appointed by an Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
and file with such Committee evidence that he possesses the good moral character and general
fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor-at-law as provided in Section 90 of the Judiciary
Law, which must be shown by the affidavits of two reputable persons residing in the city or county
in which he resides, one of whom must be a practicing attorney of the Supreme Court or this
State." Rule VIII-2: "Such affidavits must state that the applicant is, to the knowledge or the
affiant, a person of good moral character and must set forth in detail the facts upon which such
knowledge is based. Such affidavits shall not be conclusive, and the court may make further
examination and inquiry through its Committeee on Character and Fitness or otherwise." Rule
VI I-4: "The justices of the Appellate Division in each department shall adopt for their respective
departments such additional rules for ascertaining the moral and general fitness of applicants as
to such justices may seem proper."
8. See notes 66, 68, 70, 72 infra.
9. Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the statutory scheme, through overly broad, vague, and
unascertainable standards, unlawfully delegated to defendants the means to deprive plaintiffs of
admission to the bar. Therefore, the scheme violated first amendment rights of free association
and expression, the fifth amendment right to a fair hearing, the sixth amendment right of
assistance of counsel, the ninth amendment right of privacy, and fourteenth amendment rights.
Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff at 9-10, Law Students Civil Rights Research Council,
Inc. v. Wadmond, 299 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
10. In addition to the affidavits of good moral character and complete answers to the
tendered questions, applicants, as a matter of practice, must appear for a personal interview before
a member of the Committee on Character and Fitness. Rule VIII-2, RULES OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ADMISSION OF ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS-AT-LAW, published as an
appendix to N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW (McKinney 1968).
-11. See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957).
12. See. e.g., Ex Parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529 (1824) (Marshall, J.) (premising
judicial regulation on the need to maintain the respectability of the bar and harmony with the
bench).
13. See. e.g., Act of Jan. 24, 1865, ch. 20, 13 Stat. 424; Act of July 2, 1862, ch, 128, 12
Stat. 502.
14. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (i866).
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Confederate Congress during the Civil War refused to take a
declaratory oath disavowing his participation in the Confederacy as a
condition for admission to the bar. The Supreme Court held the oath
unconstitutional since it functioned as a bill of attainder and ex post
facto punishment.' s Garland was an early example of the Court's
willingness to review qualifications for admission to the bar and clearly
held that a lawyer is an officer of the court and not an officer of the
government. During World War 1,16 the area of loyalty and national
security produced considerable litigation; 17 however, disbarment rather
than admissions cases prevailed.18 Although few bar admission cases
were litigated during World War II, 1 the Supreme Court, in In re
Summers, 2 held that denial of admission to the bar by a state court
on the ground that the applicant could not in good faith take the

required oath did not violate the first amendment guarantee of freedom
of religion. 21 The Cold War proliferated loyalty-security oaths; 2 but no

significant cases involving the legal profession2 3 arose until Schware v.
15. Ironically, Mr. Garland ultimately became Attorney General of the United States.
16. In the interim between the Civil War and World War I, there was a dearth of legal
character litigation. In Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872), upholding the state's
power to deny a woman admission to the bar, the Court affirmed the proposition that the right
to practice law was not a privilege or immunity of a citizen within the fourteenth amendment.
See also hi re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894).
17. See. e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). See generally Chaffee, Freedom of
Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1919).
18. See. e.g.. it re Margolis, 269 Pa. 206, 112 A. 478 (1921) (advocating anarchism and
obstructing the draft); In re Clifton, 33 Idaho 614, 196 P. 670 (1921) (disbarment for making
unpatriotic statements reversed); Lotto v. State, 208 S.W. 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) (statement
that "'Germany is going to win the war and I hope she will" not ground for disbarment); In re
Hofstede, 31 Idaho 448, 173 P. 1087 (1918) (advising men not to register for selective service).
19. See. e.g., Application of Cassidy, 268 App. Div. 282, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1944), of 'd,
296 N.Y. 926, 73 N.E.2d 41 (1947).
20. 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
21. In Summers, Justice Black initiated his consistent dissent in bar admission cases dealing
with loyalty oaths: "Test oaths, designed to impose civil disabilities upon men for their beliefs
rather than for unlawful conduct, were an abomination to the founders of this nation."
Id. at 576 (Black, J., dissenting). The precedent value of Summers has been weakened
by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). Girouard held that an alien who is willing to
take an oath of allegiance and to serve in the army as a non-combatant, but who is unwilling to
bear arms in defense of the country,because of religious scruples, may be admitted to citizenship.
22. See notes 39-40 infra and accompanying text.
23. The Supreme Court, however, recognized that permanent disbarment for alleged
unprofessional conduct by lawyers defending accused Communists was an unnecessarily severe
penalty. See Sacher v. Association of the Bar, 347 U.S. 388 (1954); cf In re Isserman, 348 U.S.
I (1954). In Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952), the Court upheld contempt charges
against lawyers defending communists, but indicated that: "We are not unaware or unconcerned
that persons identified with unpopular causes may find it difficult to enlist the counsel of their
choice." Id. at 13.
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Board of Bar Examiners2' and Konigsberg v. State Bar22 (Konigsberg
I). In Schware, New Mexico had denied the applicant admission to the
bar on the ground that he had not demonstrated "good moral
character," because some twenty years earlier, he had used certain
aliases to obtain employment, had been arrested in a labor dispute, and
had been a member of the Communist Party. After examining these
events and the affirmative evidence of Schware's good character, the
Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Black, concluded that there was
no evidence in the record which justified a finding that Schware was
morally unfit to practice law. 26 In Konigsberg I, decided the same day,
an applicant had been denied admission to the bar on the grounds that
he had failed to prove that-he was of good moral character and that
he did not advocate the overthrow of the government by
unconstitutional means. Konigsberg had refused to answer questions
intended to ascertain whether he was or ever had been a member of the
Communist Party. The majority of the Court indicated that
Konigsberg had not been denied admission solely becaus6 of his refusal
to answer the questions (an issue on which it reserved judgment) and
held that upon an examination of the record the evidence did not
rationally support the two grounds upon which admission was denied."
In 1961, the Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether denial of
admission to the bar for refusing to answer questions concerning
advocacy of the objectives of subversive organizations constituted a
denial of first and fourteenth amendment rights. In Konigsberg v. State
Bart2 (Konigsberg II) and In re Anastaplo,2 the Court affirmed state
exclusion decisions since the questions were substantially relevant to an
investigation determining fitness to practice law. By refusing to answer
such questions, the applicants were obstructing the investigation of the
examining committees. Four dissenting Justices maintained that
compelling disclosure would be violative of the first and fourteenth
amendments.3 0 In subsequent cases, the Court applied stringent
24. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
25. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
26. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 246-47 (1957).
27. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 262 (1957). Justice Harlan, dissenting, stated
that the Court was acting like "a super state court of appeals." Id. at 277.
28. 366 U.S. 36 (1961). See Kalven & Steffen, The Bar Admission Cases: An Llnflnished
Debate Between Justice Harlanand Justice Black, 21 LAW INTRANSITION 155 (1961).
29. 366 U.S. 83 (1961); see Berns, Two Old Conservatives Discuss the Anastaplo Case, 54
CORNELL L. REV. 920 (1969).

30. Justice Black, dissenting, reiterated his absolutist view that first amendment rights
should not be balanced. Id. at 111-13.
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procedural due process restrictions to bar admission hearings .3 In
Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners,32 the Supreme Court of
California reversed a fitness committee's exclusion of an applicant who
had been arrested for misdemeanors in civil rights demonstrations. The

decision demonstrates a judicial policy preventing arbitrary denial from
the bar and protecting the individual's broad fourteenth amendment
rights from infringement by the state.
Inextricably related to the issue of character examinations for
admission to the bar are analogous cases involving loyalty-security

oaths for government regulated professions and employment, and the
constitutionally permissible scope of state inquiry in determining an

applicant's potential employment fitness. Early test oaths for ministers,
attorneys, and other professional men were unconstitutional because

they functioned as bills of attainder and ex post facto punishment. 33 In
attempting to prevent arbitrary action by a state, while recognizing

valid state interests which must necessarily impinge on individual
freedom, the Supreme Court found it necessary to devise some test by
which these two factors could be resolved. The "clear and present

danger" test was first adopted by the Court to determine when a
substantial state interest justified governmental invasion of the need for

individual expression. 34 The Court next adopted a balancing test, which
31. See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), overruling, Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117
(1961) (selfincrimination clause of fifth amendment is applicable in disbarment hearings);
Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (applicant cannot be
denied admission without a hearing on the charges against him). In Spevack, Justice Harlan,
dissenting, discussed the broad ramifications of the majority's opinion: "It exposes this Court
itself to the possible indignity that it may one day have to admit to its own bar such a lawyer
[one invoking the self-incrimination clause] unless it can somehow get at the truth of suspicions,
the investigation of which the applicant has previously succeeded in blocking. For I can perceive
no distinction between 'admission' and 'disbarment' in the rationale of what is now held."
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 522 (1967). Justice Fortas, concurring, condoned inquiry by
questions specifically relating to the conduct of a lawyer's job but rejected questioning by the
state into the beliefs of the lawyer. Id. at 519-20.
32. 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966).
33. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866), which stated an equalitarian
position: "The theory upon which our political institutions rest is, that all men have certain
unalienable rights-that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and that in
the pursuit of happiness all avocations, all honors, all positions, are alike open to every one, and
that in the protection of these rights all are equal before the law." Id. at 321. The oath in
Cummings extended to words, desires, and sympathies. On the other hand, the police power of
the state to require good character as a condition to the practice of medicine was affirmed in
Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
34. See. e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (195i); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927).
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has vitality today.3' Under this analysis, as the social value of state
action increases, greater incursions into individual affairs appear
reasonable and not arbitrary. 3 The broad concept of due process has

allowed the Supreme Court to strike a balance between individual and
state interests."

In Dent v. West Virginia,3 the Court held that due

process was intended to secure a citizen against any arbitrary
deprivation of his rights, which include the ability to follow any lawful

business, calling, or profession. Loyalty tests as a condition of
employment appeared extensively in the early 1950's; in the majority

of cases the Supreme Court held that state loyalty oaths were not a
deprivation of due process..3 9 As the McCarthy era ended, several
Supreme Court cases held questions in state loyalty investigations to
be violative of due process. If the question itself was unrelated to any
legitimate state interest, regardless of the individual's answer, it was
unlawful to ask the question, to deny any benefit sought because of a
refusal to answer, or to penalize the individual for failure to cooperate."
35. Mr. justice Black, however, has retained his position that first amendment rights are
absolute aod cannot be balanced. See. e.g., Barenblatt v. United States. 360 U.S. 109. 137-38
(1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
36. See. e.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds. 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (oath
required of union officer renouncing belief in the overthrow of the government by violent, illegal,
or unconstitutional methods did not violate the first amendment).
37. See. e.g., Note, The Void-For- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme ourt, 109 U. PA.
L. REv. 67 (1960).
38. 129 U.S. 114 (1889). See also Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (the individual
has a fourteenth amendment right to engage in any of the common occupations of life).
39. Compare Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (city employees), Adler
v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (teachers), and Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341
U.S. 56 (1951) (candidates), with Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (state loyalty oath
barring innocent teacher from employment without knowing association is a violation of due
process). An example of a constitutionally valid oath appeared in Gerende v. Board of
Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951). The oath required a candidate to pledge that he was not a person
-'engaged in one way or another in the attempt to overthrow the government by force or
violence." and that he was not knowingly a member of an organization engaged in such an
attempt.
40. See. e.g., Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (compulsory disclosure of NAACP
chapter membership list under a city occupational license tax ordinance held unconstitutional);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (contempt conviction for plaintiff's failure to produce
a membership list of a local chapter under a statute ascertaining qualifications to conduct
intrastate business held invalid); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (dismissal of
professor for refusal to answer committee questions by invoking the fifth amendment held
invalid). But see Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. I (1960) (summary discharge of
public employee for refusal to answer questions at legislative hearing valid because of
insubordination); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (professor fired and sentenced
for refusing to answer whether he was then or had ever been a Communist was in furtherance of
valid legislative purpose to investigate the Communist Party); Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357
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In Speiser v. Randall,4 the Court invalidated a California
statute which required, as a prerequisite for the veteran's property tax

exemption, that the applicant swear an oath

2

which the majority

viewed as a limitation of free speech and a denial of due process. In
Shelton v. Tucker, 3 the Court struck down a state statute compelling
every teacher, as a condition of employment in a state supported school
or college, to file annually an affidavit listing every organization to
which he had belonged or regularly contributed within the preceding
five years.44 The current approach continued in Cramp v. Board of

Public Instruction," invalidating an oath for state employees as being
void for vagueness, ancl in Aptheker v. Secretar-yof State,46 implicitly

recognizing the vitality of the right of free association in subversive
activities cases. In Aptheker, the Supreme Court held a section of the

Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 unconstitutional on its face
since the section indiscriminately infringed upon the fifth amendment
substantive due process right to travel. In Baggett v. Bullitt,47 the Court
U.S. 399 (1958) (state's interest in determining the qualifications of teachers in public schools
including political beliefs outweighed the deterrent effect upon freedom of speech and association
caused by compulsory disclosure); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) (dismissal of public
employee for refusal to answer questions relating to Communist affiliation upheld).
41. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
42. The oath read: "I do not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United
States or the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means, nor advocate the
support of a foreign government against the United States in the event of hostilities." Id. at 5S5.
43. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
44. The Court concluded that the statute violated the first amendment freedom of
association. "The unlimited and indiscriminate sweep of the statute now before us brings it within
the ban of our prior cases. The statute's comprehensive interference with associational freedom
goes far beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the State's legitimate inquiry into the
fitness and competency of its teachers." Id. at 490.
45. 368 U.S. 278 (1961). The Florida statute required every employee to swear in writing
that they have never "knowingly lent their aid, support, advice, counsel, or influence to the
Communist Party." Id. at 279. Cf NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (solicitation of legal
suits by civil rights group). "[S]tandards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area
of free speech." Id. at 432. In Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539
(1963), the plaintiffs alleged that a legislative investigation intruded upon their first and fourteenth
amendment associational rights. In light of this contention, the Court required the state to show
a substantial relationship between the information sought-NAACP membership lists-and a
compelling state interest.
46. 378 U.S. 500 (1964). The challenged section proscribed travel abroad by any communist
organization member who had knowledge or notice that such organization was registered or under
final order to register with the Subversive Activities Control Board. Id. at 501-02.
47. 377 U.S. 360 (1964). The two oaths were: (1)a "positive loyalty oath" imposed on
teachers, making them subscribe, inter alia, that they would "by precept and example promote
respect for the flag and [federal and state] institutions, reverence for law and order and undivided
allegiance to the federal government;" and (2) a "negative disclaimer" imposed on all state
employees requiring them to vow that they were not a "subversive person" or members of
"subversive organizations." "Subversive person" was defined by the state law as "any person
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struck down two loyalty oaths required of state employees and
indicated that measures which purport to define disloyalty must be
drawn precisely so that public servants are cognizant of the definition

of disloyalty. The Court enunciated the concept of overbreadth48 in
49 and further developed and
Brown v. Louisiana,
applied the doctrine

to loyalty-security and character schemes in Elfbrandt v. Russel2 and
United States v. Robel.5 ' In Elfbrandt, the oath and accompanying

"statutory gloss" purported to exclude from employment members not
subscribing to the unlawful ends of prohibited organizations.
Consequently, the statutory scheme infringed upon first amendment
associational rights. 52 In Robel, the Court invalidated a section of the
Subversive Activities Control Act for overbreadth because of a
provision proscribing any member of a Communist organization from
knowingly engaging in employment in a designated defense facility
while such organization was registered or under final order to register
with the Subversive Activities Control Board. The provision was
overbroad since it established guilt by association without a
determination that the individual's association posed the subversive
threat feared by the government. 53 -The Court continued to circumscribe

the permissible scope of loyalty oaths and accompanying regulations
in the areas of education, 54 admission of a duly elected representative
who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the commission, or advocates, abets, advises or
teaches by any means any person to commit, attempt to commit, or aid in the commission of
any act intended to overthrow, destroy or alter . . . the constitutional form of the federal or state
government ... "Id. at 361-62.
48. See Note, Judicial Rewriting of Overbroad Statutes: Protecting the Freedom of
Association From Scales to Robel, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 240 n.7 (1969): "The concept of
overbreadth must be distinguished from the concept of vagueness. . . . The individual never
knows when he is subject to criminal sanctions under a statute which is unconstitutionally vague."
An overbroad statute is one that deters the exercise of first amendment rights because the actor
knows he is subject to criminal statutes. Id.
49. 383 U.S. 131, 143 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring).
50. 384 U.S. 11(1966).
51. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
52. The oath provided: " . . .do solemnly swear ..
that I will support the Constitution
of the United States and the Constitution and laws of the State of Arizona; that I will bear true
faith and allegiance to the same, and defend them against all enemies . . . ." "The Legislature
put a gloss on the oath by subjecting to prosecution for perjury and for discharge from public
office anyone who took the oath and who 'knowingly and wilfully becomes or remains a member
of the Communist Party of the United States or its successors or any of its subordinate
organizations' or 'any other organization' having for 'one of its purposes' the overthrow of the
government of Arizona . . . where the employee had knowledge of the unlawful purpose." 384
U.S. at 12-13.
53. Therefore, the Act encompassed membership which was constitutionally protected.
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967).
54. See Whitehall v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967) (sections of state loyalty oath do not
distinctly delineate between permissible and impermissible conduct); Keyishian v. Board of
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to a state legislature, 5 and eligibility of a seaman for promotion. 6

Federal courts have advanced the trend by holding that loyalty-security
programs constitute an unconstitutionally restrictive means of
accomplishing specific state and federal objectives.5 1 On the other hand,

in Knight v. Board of Regents, 8 the Court affirmed a decision holding
that New York could reasonably require teachers in public or tax

exempt institutions to subscribe to an oath supporting the federal and
state constitutions and observing professional standards of competence

and dedication.
In the instant case, after disposing of procedural matters,5 9 the

court held that section 90(l)(a) of the Judiciary Law6 was not

Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (demonstrating the uncertainty of such words as "advising,"
"advocacy," "teaches," and "seditious" in the state loyalty laws and regulations). "The very
intricacy of the [New York] plan and the uncertainty as to the scope of its proscriptions make it
a highly efficient in terrorenm mechanism." Id. at 601.
55. In Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966), a unanimous Court held that the Georgia House
of Representatives violated the freedom of expression of Mr. Julian Bond, a duly elected
representative, by excluding him from the legislature because of statements he made and endorsed.
The State claimed the right to examine Bond in order to test his sincerity and ability to take the
constitutional oath. The Court ruled that the state did not have this right because "[s]uch power
could be utilized to restrict the right of legislators to dissent from national or state policy or that
of a majority of their colleagues under the guise of judging their loyalty to the Constitution."
Id. at 132.
56. Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968).
57. See, e.g., Gilmore v. James, 274 F. Supp. 75 (N.D. Tex. 1967), affd, 389 U.S. 572
(1968) (statute prescribing an oath that state employees were not members of organizations on
Attorney General's list was invalid because it applied to membership without specific intent to
further the illegal aims of such organizations as well as membership with specific intent); Reed
v. Gardner, 261 F. Supp. 87 (C.D. Cal. 1966) (provision of Health Insurance for the Aged Act
denying benefits to members of organizations required to register under the Internal Security Act
of 1950, as well as the use of questions inquiring whether applicants were members of such
organizations, is unconstitutional as violative of first amendment rights of free speech, assembly,
and association).
58. 269 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), affd, 390 U.S. 36 (1968) (per curiam); see note 64
infra.
59. Judge Friendly, writing for the court, stated that: (1)plaintiffs had standing to sue as
a class because they had sufficiently set themselves apart from the rest of the populace during
their period of legal study; (2) the court of appeals need not be joined because the legislature
delegated control over admissions to the appellate divisions; and (3) abstention was not
appropriate in this matter of state concern since the Supreme Court had rejected such claims in
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
60. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 90(l)(a) (McKinney 1968), provides: "Upon the state board
of law examiners certifying that a person has passed the required examination . . . the appellate
division of the supreme court in the department to which such person shall have been certified
by the state board of law examiners, if it shall be satisfied that such person possesses the character
and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor-at-law, shall admit him to practice
. . .in all the courts of this state, provided that he has in all respects complied with the rules of
the court of appeals and the rules of the appellate divisions relating to the admission of
attorneys."
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impermissibly vague. The court found no significant distinction
between New York's requirement of character and general fitness and

California's requirement of "good moral character," which was
implicitly approved in Konigsberg 11.61 The majority ruled that the
substantive challenge to Rule 940662 was grounded on recent loyalty

oath cases which were distinguishable in the instant context. 3
Furthermore, the court indicated that Rule 9406 was not an oath which
hung in terrorem over persons seeking admission to the bar since it

only applied to belief at the time of admission. The majority further
assumed that Rule 9406 would be implemented in accordance with its

constitutional purpose; namely, to test whether applicants for
admission to the bar can truly subscribe to the "constitutional oath of
office." 64 After deciding that a three-judge court was appropriate to
review the questionnaires, 5 the court considered the questions
individually. Question 27(b)"6 was upheld as being essentially equivalent
61. 366 U.S. 36,40-44 (1961).
62. N.Y.R. Civ. PRAC. 9406 (McKinney 1963) entitled "Proof" provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall receive said certificate from any committee and no person shall be admitted to
practice as an attorney and counselor-at-law in the courts of this state, unless he shall furnish
satisfactory proof to the effect: 1.That he believes in the form of the government of the United
States and is loyal to such government.
...
The majority distinguished the instant case from
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), in two respects. First, the Supreme Court in Speiser
differentiated between loyalty oaths required of all veterans and oaths required of a limited class
of persons in public positions who could create serious danger to the public safety. The instant
court assumed that lawyers, as officers of the court, would fit into the latter distinction. Secondly,
the court held that the Rule did not impose a true burden of proof, as the plaintiffs' alleged,
relying on Speiser, but a permissible burden of coming forward with the evidence.
63. The Court distinguished Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11 (1966); and Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
64. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 466 (McKinney 1967), requires each person admitted to the
Bar to subscribe to the "Constitutional oath of office.": "I do solemnly swear . . . that I will
support the constitution of the United States, and the constitution of the State of New York, and
that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office . . . according to the best of my ability."
N.Y. CoN s. art. XIII, § 1.This oath was upheld in Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F. Supp.
339 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), affd, 390 U.S. 36 (1968).
65. The defendants contended that since the questionnaires under attack covered only two
of New York's four departments, the case comes within the judicial exception to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2281 (1964), that excludes controversies not of state-wide importance. The court denied this
contention because the effect of admission or denial is state-wide. Furthermore, the court noted
that sound policy requires a three-judge court to decide all issues, even though jurisdiction over
one is debatable.
66. Questionnaire and Statement, N.Y. Appellate Division, Supreme Court, First
Department, Committee on Character and Fitness, 1968 [hereinafter cited as First Department
Questionnaire]: 27. (a) Do you believe in the principles underlying the form of government of the
United States of America? (b) Can you conscientiously, and do you, affirm that you are, without
any mental reservation, loyal to and ready to support the Constitution of the United States
(emphasis added)?
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to the state "constitutional oath," which was affirmed in Knight.67 The
majority found question 27(a) impermissible since the word
"principles" was so vague that an applicant who favored drastic,
though constitutional, reforms might be conscientiously unable to
answer with a simple "yes." Likewise, question 2668 was held invalid
as imposing a potentially deterrent effect on the exercise of the
constitutionally protected right of association. The court noted that the
state's interest in informing itself of the prior associations of candidates
for the bar with subversive organizations can be adequately protected
by a question "more narrowly phrased." 69 Question 3171 was held to
have a serious in terrorem effect in that no interest of the state was
sufficiently compelling to require the applicant to review his entire life
history under the threat of denial of admission. 7' The court held that
question 32(b)r was valid since an applicant who had read the Canon
of Ethics need only explain why he dissented from a particular
provision. Finally, the majority reasoned that the alleged broadness of
the personal interview would necessarily contract when the scope of
written inquiry was amended in compliance with the court's opinion.
In spite of this conclusion, the court did not issue an injunction because
of considerations of comity for respected fellow judges who administer
the character investigations.13 Judge Motley, concurring and dissenting
67. 269 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), affd, 390 U.S. 36 (1968).
68. First Department Questionnaire:26. Have you ever organized or helped to organize or
become a member of or participatedin any way whatsoever in the activities of any organization
or group of persons which teaches or (taught) or advocates (or advocated) that the Government
of the United States or any State or anypolitical subdivision thereof should be overthrown or
overturned by force violence or any unlawful means? If your answer is in the affirmative, state
the facts below (emphasis added).
69. 299 F. Supp. at 131.
70. First Department Questionnaire:31. Is there any incident in your life not called for by
the foregoing questions which has any favorable or detrimental bearing on your character or
fitness? If the answer is yes, state the facts.
71. The first direction at the head of the First Department Questionnairereads: "This is a
statement made under oath. Applicant's failure fully and accurately to disclose any facts or
information called for by any question may result in denial of the application for admission, or
if applicant shall have been admitted before the discovery thereof, in the revocation of his license
to practice law."
72. First Department Questionnaire:32. (a) Have you read the Canons of Ethics adopted
by the American and New York State Bar Associations? (b) Will you conscientiously endeavor
to conform your professional conduct to them?
73. Earlier in the opinion, the court held that it had the power to issue an injunction against
a judge, although under The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a judge was not liable
for damages under the doctrine of Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).' "To hold otherwise would
be to leave without a remedy a significant class of the deprivations of federal rights under color
of state law that Congress intended the federal courts to redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
299 F. Supp. at 124.
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in part, reasoned that although section 90 of the Judiciary Law was
constitutional, its interpretation, implementation, and application by
the defendants was invalid. She concluded that Rule 9406 was
unconstitutional on its face and as interpreted, implemented, and
applied by the defendants. The dissent indicated that the term "moral
character," though not defined for purposes of the character affidavits,
is not unconstitutional on the ground of vagueness because of proper
past usuage. The affidavits and questionnaires adopted to implement
section 90, however, failed to meet the standard of precision applicable
to state regulations involving first amendment freedoms. She further
noted that a strict application of the challenged statutes improperly
focused upon an applicant's political beliefs and associations and
resulted in an inappropriate use of a political test in determining
admission to the bar.74 Judge Motley found that Rule 9404 violated the
first and fourteenth amendments because the applicant
unconstitutionally bears the burden of proof.7 Also, Rule 9404 lacked
sufficient standards for determining who would be admitted to the
bar.7 Finally, the dissent concluded that the public danger actually
created by a "subversive" lawyer is small, and that adequate criminal
penalties and disbarment measures existed to punish and deter
77
irresponsible conduct.
The unquarried depths of good moral character are pretermitted
by the majority's holding, which places too much trust in fellow judges
to determine the fate of an applicant to the bar by means of an
imprecise and subjective standard. 7 The personal interview to
determine fitness, which the dissent incisively viewed as delving deeply
into personal belief, is unavoidably influenced to a great extent by the
personal predilections79 of a traditionally conservative bar."0 The
74. Judge Motley also found an invasion of the right of privacy in the state's questioning
of every affiant concerning the applicant's personal life. 299 F. Supp. at 135, 145.
75. Judge" Motley's opinion relies heavily on Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).

76. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), was cited in the opinion for
authority.
77. See Note, Inquiries Into the Political Beliefs and Activities of Applicantsfor Admission
to the Bar, I COLUM. SURVEY OF HUMAN RIGHTS L. 33 (1968).
78. See Brown & Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. Cm. L. REV. 489

(1953).
79.

In 1953, commentators indicated that "bar examiners everywhere are groping for fair

resolutions between the demands created by anticommunist tensions and the common tradition

of implicit loyalty that did not have to be 'proved' or sworn to." Id. at 499.
80. See Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Process of Admission to the Bar, 23
N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV. 135, 152 (1969). See also Larson, The Lawyer as Conservative, 40
CORNELL L.Q. 183 (1955).

1969]

RECENT CASES

protean nature of contemporary mores and the debate centered on the
generation gap lend support to the proposition that bar examining
committees will be facing an influx of applicants whose personal beliefs
concerning the legal profession and the country sharply differ from
those of the examining lawyer.8 ' The inevitable result of such conflict
can only be the rejection of conscientious and scrupulous law students
who hold radical beliefs.82 In reality, only the honest andingenuous will
be faced with exclusion since the hard-core disloyal applicant will have
no compunction about taking any form of oath.81 This collision of
values is not recognized by the majority in the instant case.
Although the majority predicated much of its decision on
Konigsberg II and In re Anastaplo, recent cases such as Elfbrandt,
Keyshian, and Robel have cast serious doubt on the vitality of the
former cases as precedent. The majority also delegated the initiative of
reform to the very body which promulgated the rules and regulations."
True reform in the structure of character investigations will result only
when the committees realize that the statutory scheme constitutes an
unnecessarily restrictive means of accomplishing state objectives. One
commentator has suggested that the standard of "dishonorable
conduct relevant to the occupation" should be the touchstone for
character committees rather than "good moral character".8 5 Such a
standard would be particularly relevant to the legal profession since
only overt illegal conduct could be considered as grounds for exclusion;
and even such conduct, if the standard is strictly applied, would not
exclude all applicants who had been arrested or convicted of a crime. 86
81.. One scholar has noted that a number of students will shun the legal profession rather
than compromise their ideals. "Perhaps those idealistic students who now shun law schools and
the legal profession are quite right; they would find little place for themselves in the present day
profession." Reich, Toward the Humanistic Study of Law, 74 YALE L.J. 1402, 1408 (1965). See
A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DIssENr AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 43-57 (1968), which discusses
civil disobedience by contemporary youth; Note, Admission to the Bar Following Conviction for
Refusal of Induction, 78 YALE'L.J. 1352 (1969), which concludes that conscientious refusal of
induction into the military cannot constitutionally be the sole basis for denial of admission to the
bar. The breadth of the good moral character standard and the vagueness of the term "reputation
of the bar" are critically explored.
82. In American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 439 (1950), Justice
Jackson, dissenting in part, reasoned: "Moreover, in judging the power to deny a privilege to
think otherwise, we cannot ignore the fact that our own Government originated in revolution and
is legitimate only if overthrow by force may sometimes be justified. That circumstances sometimes
justify it is not Communist doctrine, but an old American belief."

83.

Cf. F.

MEYER, THE MOLDING OFA COMMUNIST

(1959).

84. Brown & Fassett, supra note 75, at 483: "[T]he strength of a rule, as against legal
attacks on its validity, is clearly enhanced when it is the offspring of the very court asked to undo
'it, rather than of the legislature or of a committee of the bar." Id.

85.

V.GELLHORN,

INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS

150 (1956).

86. See, e.g., Hallinafi v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55
Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966).
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This standard would also take into consideration the fact that few
applicants have been exposed to situations in which character defects
might be revealed.87 For these reasons, a strong argument can be made
for departure from the entire character examination and reliance by the
legal profession upon disbarment and criminal penalties. Another
proposed resolution involves four steps: (1) the committee must initially
presume the applicant loyal; (2) if an applicant's statement contains no
disclosure of illegal political conduct, the committee must marshall
evidentiary suppdrt for its negative presumptions; (3) no disclosure of
first amendment rights should be required until the committee explicitly
demonstrates on the record by independent evidence the relevance of the
answer to its inquiry; and (4) the evidentiary showing must give in
detail the source of information and the method by which it was
obtained. 9 Hard cases will inevitably arise under any standard adopted
by the examining committee, for example, the person who believes in
the necessity of revolution but who assures examiners that he will not
participate himself.1 Recent cases such as Robel should control the
situation in which a Communist applicant who does not advocate
violent overthrow but views the Party as an instrument of social reform
is denied admission to the bar.
The significance of an independent bar and the important role of
the lawyer in a democratic society has been enunciated too often for
the majority to ignore the implications of its limited holding.', The
dissent recbgnizes the deterrent effect broad inquiry will have on law
students, who will be more reluctant to join an organization or invoke
87.

See Gellhorn supra note 85, at 151 n.

88.

See Note, supra note 77, at 43; "Given a politically suspect lawyer, it might be slightly

more difficult to keep him from being admitted to the bar by drawing inferences from some

knowledge of or official research into his present or past political beliefs than to support
disciplinary action on the basis of his actual past behavior in court. The first method belongs in
the prudential area of planning total political security for an incumbent political system-always
a problematic affair; the other is a control measure against specific abuses in the exercise of the
lawyer's functioh." 0. KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE 254 (1961). See generally Selinger &
Schoen, "To Purify the Bar": A ConstitutionalApproach to Non-Professional Misconduct, 5
NATURAL RESOURCES

J. 299 (1965).

89. See Note, supra note 80, at 151-52. See also Note, Procedural Due Process and
CharacterHearingsfor Bar Applicants, 15 STAN. L. Rav. 500 (1963).
90. See Brown & Fasset, supra note 78, at 502.
91. See, e.g., Casper, Lawyers and Loyalty-Security Litigation, 3 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 575
(1969); Ernst & Schwartz, The Right to Counsel and the "Unpopular Cause," 20 U. PITT. L.
REv. 725 (1959); Jackson, The Advocate: Guardian of Our Traditional Liberties, 36 A.B.A.J.
607 (1950); Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. I (1934); Note, The
"Right" to PracticeLaw, I DUKE L.J. 249 (1951).
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a cause. 2 Indeed, in 1953, a commentator noted that "the consequence
of aimless hectoring of students about membership in left-wing
organizations, like the National Lawyers Guild, may obviously be, as
the word gets along, to discourage other students from joining such
organizations. '113 Upholding such extensive inquires may lead to a
deplorable attitude on the part of applicants and result in lip service
and pro forma filing of an application. The serious consequence of not
affording first amendment protection to prospective lawyers ensues
from conditioning the right to pursue a chosen profession" on a waiver
by the applicant of his constitutional rights. The concept of a
profession as a property right *ubject to minimal state interference
conflicts with the implicit view of the majority. 5
The broad depth of inquiry implicitly approved in the instant case
can be better examined in a comparative light with character
requirements in other countries. The Canadian province of Ontario
abolished the character investigation after finding no relationship
between conduct prior to admission and professional capacity. 6 In
England and Ireland, a complex of strong disciplinary rules coupled
with a comprehensive apprentice process provides the functional
equivalent of our admissions examination without necessitating a
92. "To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving,
government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it." In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82,
115-16 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). See also Note, "'Good Moral Character"as a Prerequisite
to Admission to the Bar: hIferences to be Drawn From Past Acts and Prior Membership in the
Conmunist Party, 65 YALE L.J. 873 (1956).
93. Brown & Fassett, supra note 78, at 401. "However desirable such a result might seem
to the individual examiner, he should hardly use his official capacity to achieve it." Id.
94. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474
(1959) (the individual right to pursue a profession).
95. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); "The applicant who has
expended time, energy and a large amount of money on legal education has as much a right to
... Note supra note 81, at 1379.
practice as the practicing lawyer.
96. In response to a question concerning the extent bar examining authorities investigate
an applicant's character before admission to the bar, Richard J. Roberts, Director, Ontario Bar
Admissions Course, replied: "[W]e take people into the Bar Admissions Course, with LL.B.
degrees, as a matter of right. We used to require character certificates, and I saw no sense in
them whatever. Everybody in the world can find a number of people who are stupid enough to
give him character references, and I see no purpose in reading hundreds of these things, saying
that he's a good fellow, when he may turn out to be quite otherwise later. Besides, in the days
when these character references were required, it seemed to have no relation to subsequent
disbarment. Some of the people who were disbarred had some of the most glowing character
references you ever read, when you went back to their file." Response of John W. Durnford,
Associate Professor of Law, McGill University, to the above question: "It is difficult
to examine effectually as to character, and I do not believe that the Bar makes a practice of it,
though it has theright to." The Canadian Approach to Legal Education and Admission to the
Bar, 36 BAR EXAMINER 6, 34 (1967).
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determinative character examinationY Although requiring proof of
character, Australian states have eliminated New York's probing

interview and questionnaire. One procedure requires the applicant to
supply two character references and a certification of good conduct."
Another method stipulates the posting of the student's name in a

widely circulated newspaper to provide an opportunity for public

objections to that individual's admission to the bar." Thus many

foreign jurisdictions do not subject the applicant to the political

colloquy which accompanies character inquiry under the typical New

York scheme. The particular emphasis on communist affiliation as a
basis of exclusion in the United States is not followed elsewhere. In
France, for example, the Counseil d'Etat admitted five applicants to
the civil service after their denial because of communist ties. 01
Furthermore, the Soviet system serves as a useful comparison to the

policies of the profession in the United States. The Soviet lawyer is
required to be loyal to the Party and to the political, economic, and

social system which the Party represents. 0' An analogy between the
Soviet system and the exclusion of Communists from the legal
97.

Cf. B. HOLLANDER,

THE ENGLISH BAR:

A

PRIESTHOOD

(1964); G.

RUDD,

THE

ENGLISH

(1962). Admission for a Barrister requires two certificates of good moral character
from two responsible residents of the United Kingdon who have known the applicant for one year
or more and have had opportunities of judging his character. An applicant is not eligible for
admission if he is an undischarged bankrupt or has been convicted of a criminal offence of such
a nature that the Masters of the Bench, the examining body, deem his admission undesirable, TIHE
CONSOLIDATED REGULATIONS OF THE INNS OF COURT 5-8 (rev. ed. 1968).
98. This is the procedure in New South Wales. Western Australia and Victoria require
certificates from practitioners to establish character. In Canada, similar practices are found in
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. See Cullinan, Requirements for
Admission to Practicein England, Ireland, the Australian States, New Zealand, and the
Canadian Provinces, 19 BAR EXAMINER 2-41, 69-94 (1950).
99. Id. at 23. The functional equivalent of the public evaluation has been advocated by one
author since members of the profession cannot objectively ascertain a standard of lay adequacy
an applicant must meet, which he contends, is necessary for continuing respect for lawyers and
the aaminisiation'iof' ustice. Thus the author advocates public representation on the examining
committee. Bradway, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion of Offenses that Justify Disbarnent, 24
CALIF. L. REv. 9, 25-26 (1935).
100. See C. HAMSON, EXECUTIVE DISCRETION AND JUDICIAL CONTROL 22-41 (1954);
KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 88, at 252-53. The 1958 West German Lawyer's Statute is viewed by
one author as an attempt to weed out potential political troublemakers among the legal fraternity.
He compares the statute with Anastaplo and Konigsberg II, finding neither favorable to the
politically minded lawyer seeking admission. Id. at 253-55.
101. See J. HAZARD & I. SHAPIRO, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM (1962); Barry & Berman,
The Soviet Legal Profession, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1968); cf. Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S.
399, 416 (1958) (Douglas, J., concurring): "When we make the belief of the citizen the basis of
government action, we move~toward the concept of total security. Yet total security is possible
only in a totalitarian regime-the kind of system we doubtless profess to combat."
LEGAL SYSTEM
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profession in the United States is appropriate since both systems
appear to strive for a homogeneous political philosophy.
The reconciliation of the admissions process with the policy needs
of a free society has lagged markedly. One justification for this lack
of progress is that the status of American lawyers in the administration

of justice is considerably more influential than in other countries. But
to the extent that admissions cormittees have attempted to consider

the relationship of the lawyer to the public interest, they have exhibited
an unrealistic view of the importance of the profession and the potential

harm to the public created by lawyers labeled as subversive. 10 2 The idea
that character committees are guardians of the profession affords law
0 3
students a distorted image of what conformity to the bar will entail.
The existence of overly cumbersome machinery for character
inquiry is not calculated merely to weed out the criminal offender or

the mentally unfit, rather, the investigation is structured to probe such
normative traits as reliability, acquaintances, and political views. 0 4 The

adoption of extensive character inquiry procedures in 1938,05 during a
period of social unrest and experimentation with communism," 6 lends
support to the proposition that the inquiry was conceived as a political

test for admission to the bar. Subsequenf proposals have continued to
perpetuate the existing system of inquiry. 0 7 Examples of such proposals

include fingerprinting of law students'

and character investigation at

102. An excerpt from an interview with former Chief Justice Warren illustrates a needless
over-reaction by responsible members of the bar: "Warren: I remember when President
Eisenhower appointed Loyd Wright, the former president of the American Bar Association, to
head up a committee on subversion, and he reported that great possibilities for subversion
stemmed from these young [Supreme Court] law clerks who were just out of the law school. He
referred to them as a group of young radicals and proposed in his commission report that all of
them be given complete F.B.I. investigations and that they be confirmed by the Senate before they
could be employed by the Supreme Court." The Chief Justice noted that at that particular time
the law clerks were more conservative than any young lawyers he had known. Lewis, A Talk with
Warren on Crime, the Court, the Country, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 130.
103. "[T]here is a special audience for character and fitness committees, as all law teachers
know-the audience of young law students. They are likely to learn one way or another what is
being asked. And they are certain to read any questions of this sort broadly as implying official
scrutiny and surveillance of their opinions and associations." Kalven & Steffen, supra note 28,
at 178.
104. See A. BLAUSTEIN & C. PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 213 (1954).

105.

See

THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, THE BAR EXAMINER HANDBOOK

48-107 (1968). This handbook provides an excellent history of the moral character criterion and
the rationale behind its perpetuation.
106. See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
107. See Barnes, Character Investigation Within the Model Code for Admissions, 38 BAR
EXAMINER

108.
EXAMINER

71 (1969).
See Raymond, The Role of the Law School Respecting Characterand Fitness, 35

3 (1966).

BAR
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the time of law school registration." 9 This development ignores the

deterrent effects on individuals concerned with privacy and
anonymity." 0 Although the statutory scheme may be constitutional on
its face, its application may be considered unconstitutional"' on the

authority of recent test oath cases." 2 The New York scheme of
disclosure has the same effect in restricting and deterring activities of

law students as the application of actual sanctions. Not only will
students be affected, but the freedom of the bar to accept unpopular
causes may consequently be curtailed." 3 The bar examiners must

distinguish between the lawyer as a professional and the lawyer as an
individual citizen and should accommodate and recognize divergent

political philosophies regarding governmental change. In the process of
screening lawyers, the examining committees should not attempt to

license methods of governmental change on the basis of the applicant's
political philosophy at the time of admission.'

A final challenge to the majority opinion involves the court's
statement that Rule 9406 "goes to belief at the time of admissions
only."" 5 Konigsberg I and Schware left unresolved many questions

regarding the admissions process including the examining committee's
power to search out the applicant's belief rather than conduct."'
109. See Kanner, Dual Character Investigation:At Tine of Law School Registration auid
Priorto Admission to the Bar, 30 BAR EXAMINER 60 (196 1).
110. "[T]he right of privacy implicit in the First Amendment creates an area into which
the Government may not enter." Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S.
539, 570 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring). The right of privacy in the investigative process deserves
articulation by the courts in view of the sophistication of modern computer science and other
investigative techniques. See generally Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The
Challenge of a New Technology in an Information-OrientedSociety, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1091
(1969); Symposium, Computers. Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REv. 211
(1968); NoTE, The ConstitutionalRight to Anonyntity: Free Speech. Disclosure and the Devil,
70 YALE L.J. 1084 (1964).
111. Cf. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) (dictum) (licensing scheme held
valid on its face was invalidly applied).
112. See Note, Loyalty Oaths, 77 YALE L.J. 739 (1968); Note, Civil Disabilities and the
First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 842 (1969); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amtendment,
78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
113. See The Proposed Anti-Conimunist Oath: Opposition Expressed to Association's
Policy, 37 A.B.A.J. 123, 125 (1951).
114. See Countryman, Loyalty Testsfor Lawyers, 13 LAWYERS GUILD REV. 149 (1953).
115. 299 F. Supp. 117, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (emphasis added).
116. Baird v. State Bar, cert. granted, 394 U.S. 957 (1969) (No. 1079, 1968 term;
renumbered No. 53, 1969 term) is pending argument this term before the Supreme Court. The
question presented is: "May state, consistent with First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
speech and association, Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, and Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, exclude otherwise qualified applicant from practice of law
solely because of her refusal to answer question whether she is now or ever was member of
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Questions which have been approved by the majority seem calculated
not to reveal the applicant's past or present conduct, but rather to
assure the committee that the applicant does not adhere to an
unorthodox political belief. Though freedom of mind is a recognized
constitutional right,'"7 these questions explore the subjective area of an
applicant's viewpoint with complete license. The only reason for such
inquiry in our system is to penalize the political heterodox."" "Inquiry
on the issue of advocacy of the unlawful overthrow of the government
is a greedy camel; it does not easily take its leave. It has a way of
moving on into the domain of lawful economic and political belief,
speech, and activity.""' Since the process now requires the careful
balancing of indeterminate interests and guaranteed freedoms, the
whole theory of licensing as applied to the legal profession requires reexamination. 0

Civil Rights- Desegregation-HEW is Required to Make a
Program-by-Program Finding of Discrimination in Order to
Terminate Federal Funds Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW),
having determined that petitioner, Board of Public Instruction of
Taylor County, Florida,' violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
Communist Party or any organization that advocates violent overthrow of United States

Government ..
" 38 U.S.L.W. 3006 (U.S. July 1, 1969); In re Stolar, cert. granted, 38
U.S.L.W. 3127 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1969) (No. 75).
117.

Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945): "The First Amendment gives freedom

of mind the same security as freedom of conscience."
118.

See Note,

The New Mexico Bar Admission Loyalty Oath: A Stud'

in

Unconstitutionality, 9 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 248 (1969): "Inquiring into one's political beliefs
and associations has no proper place in the determination of whether an applicant is fit to practice
law. Short of overt criminal action, a belief in the need for change, even violent change, of our
form of government bears no rational relation to the manner in which one carries out his duties
as a lawyer." Id. at 265.
119. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 52 Cal. 2d 769, 776, 344 P.2d. 777, 782 (1959) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting).
120. The balancing of an ambiguous and obscure state interest against an indeterminate and
subtle impact on free speech provides a situation in which the judge must inject his own personal
values. See Kalven & Steffen, supra note 28, at 178-79. Since an objective standard would

necessarily be restrictive, the abandonment of the character examination deserves serious study.
See generally Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation Against Political Freedom, 49
CALIF. L. REV. 4 (1961).
I. Petitioner operates a small district of 8 public schools attended by approximately 2,900
white students and 975 Negro students. Prior to the 1965-66 school year, the school board
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1964,2 entered an order terminating all federal funds3 arising under any
act of Congress until such time as the petitioner corrected its
discriminatory use of funds. Seeking judicial review, petitioner
contended that the order entered by HEW in its administrative
proceeding violated section 602 .of Title VI,1 which limits the
termination of federal financial assistance to the particular programs
or parts thereof found not in compliance with the Act. Respondent,
Robert H. Finch, Secretary of HEW, maintained that the statute
imposed no affirmative duty on HEW to make findings of fact for each
program, but only created an affirmative defense for the school board
in the event that a particular program was non-discriminatory.'
maintained these schools on an entirely segregated basis. Following passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, HEW accepted the school board's "freedom of choice" plan as compliance with
the Act. Thereafter, guidelines were issued by the Office of Education establishing minimum
standards of desegregation. For the school year 1967-68, school board officials agreed to transfer
74 Negro students, which represented less than 8% of the Negro student population, and assign
4 teachers across racial lines. The guideline requirements, however, postulated the transfer of 12%
of the Negro students and the reassignment of at least 16 teachers. After meetings between HEW
and the school board failed to procure voluntary compliance, HEW brought an action against
petitioner.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-4 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-5 (Supp. 1965-67).
Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: "No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964). In order to effectuate the goals of Title VI,
HEW, under direct legislative authority, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1964), promulgated regulations
covering racial discrimination in federally assisted school systems. 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1 to -.13
(1969). To avoid termination of funds, a school board is required to submit assurance that it is
in compliance with the Act. 45 C.F.R. § 80.4 (1969). This assurance can be made in one of three
ways: (I) submission of HEW Form 441, an assurance that the district is operating a desegregated
system, 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.4(a),(b) (1969); (2) submission of a court order directing the district to
implement a specific desegregation plan, with an assurance the district will comply, 45 C,F.R.
§ 80.4(c)(I) (1969); or (3) submission of a desegregation plan acceptable to the Commissioner,
with an assurance that the plan will be followed, 45 C.F.R. § 80.4(c)(2) (1969).
3. Petitioner was receiving federal funds under three congressional grant statutes: 20
U.S.C.A. §§ 241a-m (Supp. 1969) (federal aid for the education of children or low income
families); 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 841-48 (Supp. 1969) (federal grants for supplementary educational
centers); and 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-13 (Supp. 1969) (grants for the education of adults who have
not received a college education).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1964): '"Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to
this section may be effected (I) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance
under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the
record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such
termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other
recipient as to whom such a finding has been made and, shall be limited in its effect to the particular
program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found ....
5. Respo-dent reasoned that§ 602 of Title VI was directed to the political entity whose
funds were threatened rather than to the administrative agency terminating funds.
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Furthermore, respondent contended that the term "program" did not
refer to individual grant statutes, but to general categories such as
school and road programs. On review by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, held, order vacated and cause remanded to HEW. In order
to terminate federal funds for violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, an administrative agency must make findings of fact on
a program-by-program basis indicating that a particular program is
administered in a discriminatory manner. Board of Public Instruction
v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1608 (5th Cir. 1969).
In 1955, the Supreme Court held in Brown v. Board of Education'
that public school authorities have primary responsibility for
implementing school desegregation "with all deliberate speed." 7 In
response to only minimal progress8 in desegregation of schools under
judicial supervision,' Congress enacted Titles IV" and VI l l of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The paramount congressional purpose in passing
Title VI was to eliminate discrimination in the expenditure and receipt
of federal funds. 12 Another important objective of Title VI was to
delegate the major responsibility of desegregation to administrative
agencies.' 3 In effect, Congress required14 HEW to assume responsibility
6. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
7. Id. at 301. In effect, Brown delegated enforcement of school desegregation to the courts.
8. In 1964, only 2.25% of the Negro children in the I I States of the Confederacy and 10.9%
in the entire region of Southern and Border States were attending school with white children. Of
3,031 biracial school districts, 1,555 were still fully segregated. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
SURVEY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE SOUTHERN AND BORDER STATES 1965-66, at I (1966).
See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2504-08 (1964).
9. Utilizing a case-by-case method of enforcement, courts were incapable of handling the
burdensome task of desegregation. Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines and School Desegregation in
the South, 53 VA. L. REV. 42 (1967).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (1964). Title IV authorizes the Attorney General to bring legal
action designed to achieve desegregation when a complaint is received from an aggrieved party.
II. 42. U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-4 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-5 (Supp. IV 196567).
12. Senator Humphrey (D.-Minn.) remarked that the purpose of Title VI is to make certain
that federal funds were not used to support discrimination. 110 CONG. REC. 6544 (1964) (remarks
of Senator Humphrey). Senator Pastore (D.-R.I.) reached a similar conclusion. 110 CONG. REC.
7059 (1964) (remarks of Senator Pastore).
13. Title VI authorizes and directs each federal agency administering a financial assistance
program to take action to enforce basics principles of non-discrimination. 110 CONG. REC. 6544
(1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey). Title VI provides express statutory and legislative
authority to enforce termination standards. 110 CONG. REC. 7061-62 (1964) (remarks of Senator
Pastore).
14. Section 602 provides: "Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to
extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity . . . is authorized and directed to
effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this title with respect to such program or activity by
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for school desegregation by arming it with the effective sanction"s of
termination of funds. The Senate and House debates on Title VI
suggest that even though the language of section 602 is ambiguous,"
enforcement would be mandatory 17 whenever discrimination was found.
Although enforcement was compulsory, the legislative history indicates

a congressional desire to avoid use of termination as a punitive power
and to utilize it only as a final expedient." Unquestionably, the intent

of Congress was not to allow termination of all federal aid to a state
because there had been discrimination in one specific program.

"

Furthermore, the statutory language exemplifies a congressional intent
to limit termination "to the particular program, or part thereof" found
to be discriminatory. 2' After passage of the Act, HEW issued
issuing rules, regulations or orders ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1964). HEW is required to act
and adhere to the precise language of Title VI. 110 CONG. REC. 12720 (1964) (remarks of Senator
Humphrey).
15. Since federal financial assistance under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965 constitutes a significant portion of school budgets, termination could be deleterious: U.S.
CO.MN'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS. SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 1966-67, at 1-2 (1967).
16. Section 602 of Title VI provides: "Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant
to this section mar be effected.
...
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1964) (emphasis added). Although
Congress intended enforcement to be mandatory, the use of the word "may" seems to suggest
that enforcement was contingent upon the discretion of H EW.
17. Senator Humphrey concluded that: "Title VI will require (administrative agencies] to
act." 110 CONG. REC. 6544 (1964) (emphasis added). See Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of'1964 -Iplementation and Impact, 36 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 824, 835 (1967-68).
18. Senator Humphrey stated: "It seems to be assumed, by some of the opponents of Title
VI, that its purpose is a punitive or vindictive one. Nothing could be farther from the truth."
110 CONG. REC. 6544 (1964). Senator Pastore also stated: "Section 602, by authorizing the
agency to achieve compliance 'by other means authorized by law,' encourages agencies to find
ways to end discrimination without refusing or terminating assistance. These careful safeguards
certainly demonstrate that the proposed statute is not intended to be vindictive or punitive." 110
CONG. REC. 7063 (1964); 110 CONG. REc. 7059 (1964) (remarks of Senator Pastore).
19. Termination is contingent upon numerous restrictions and requirements: the agency
must give notice of failure to comply; attempts to secure voluntary compliance must have failed;
a hearing must specifically find discrimination; action is not final until 30 days after a written
report goes to Congress; and judicial review is available. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1964).
20. 110 CONG. REc. 6544 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey); 110 CONG. REc, 7059
(1964) (remarks of Senator Pastore); 110 CONG. REc. 7103 (1964) (remarks of Senator Javits
(R.-N.Y.)). One of the purposes of § 602 is to protect the innocent beneficiaries of programs not
affected by discrimination. Clearly, the purpose was not to effectuate wholesale cutoff of funds.
110 CONG. REC. 7061 (1964) (remarks of Senator Pastore).
21. 110 CONG. REC. 6544 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey); I0 CONG. REc. 7059
(1964) (remarks of Senator Pastore); Letter from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to Senator
Cooper, Apr. 21, 1964, in BNA, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 361 (1964) (emphasis added).
Senator Ribicoff (D.-Conn.) stated: "[Alny fund cutoff must be limited not only to the particular
program in which discrimination occurs, but also must be limited to the part of the program in
which discrimination occurs." 110 CONG. REC. 13126 (1964).
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guidelines22 establishing proper standards of desegregation that local
school boards could follow. One HEW regulation 23 allows a school
system to follow a court-approved plan of integration in place of the
guideline standards and still retain federal aid. 24 In light of this, H EW's
position as the major enforcement instrument of desegregation was
bolstered by judicial recognition of the guidelines. 25 In 1967, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals,' held that school boards had an affirmative
duty to integrate segregated public schools and that H EW's guidelines
constituted the minimum standard of integration to be utilized by the
courts. Various courts have subsequently recognized the guidelines as
the proper standard,' 7 and HEW's enforcement of Title VI through the
termination of funds has resulted in marked progress in desegregation
of schools.28 Consistently, HEW has completely terminated2" a school
district's federal funds upon a finding of discrimination in any single
program. Federal funds were suspended at the end of the fiscal year
1967 in 64 of the 4,882 Southern and Border States school districts.30
22. The 1965 and 1966 guidelines are discussed in U.S. CO.II'N ON CiviL RIGHTS.
SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 1966-67, at 10-19 (1967). For implementation of these
guidelines, see id. at 23-36. The 1968 guidelines required school boards under voluntary plans
completely to eliminate segregation in the school systems by the 1969-70 school year. 1968 HEW
ANN. REP. 69; Comment, supra note 17, at 893-95. HEW guidelines have been attacked as invalid
since the President has not formally approved them. Id. at 852.
23. 45 C.F.R. § 80.4(c) (1969): "The requirements . . . with respect to any elementary or
secondary school or school system shall be deemed to be satisfied if such school or school system
(I) is subject to final order of a court of the United States for the desegregation of such school
11

24. This exception has been the topic of much criticism as to whether a court order creating
less stringent standards can be attacked by HEW as inadequate. See Lee v. Board of Educ., 270
F. Supp. 859 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (HEW could not terminate funds and disapprove a court-adopted
and approved plan of desegregation).
25. The Fifth Circuit first recognized HEW's guidelines as constitutional in United States
v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), affd en bane. 380 F.2d 385 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). See. e.g., Kelley v. Altheimer, 378 F.2d 483 (8th
Cir. 1967); cf Alabama NAACP State Conference of Branches v. Wallace, 269 F. Supp. 346
(M.D. Ala. 1967).
26. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 840 (1967).
27. See Kemp v. Beasley, 389 F.2d 178, 185 (8th Cir. 1968); cf Davis v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 393 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1968). Recognizing the importance of circuit-wide uniformity,
other courts have decided upon their own standards. Cf Yarbrough v. School Dist., 380 F.2d
962 (8th Cir. 1967); Bowman v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1967).
28. 1968 HEWANN. REP. 69.
29. Nashville Tennessean, Sept. 23, 1969, at 9, col. 3. HEW does not attempt to separate
the funds involved into the areas specified by statute, or even into broad categories such as
vocational education or remedial reading. HEW views a school district's educational program as
a single entity. See Note, School Desegregation and The Office of Education Guidelines, 55 GEo.
L.J. 325, 344 (1966).
30. 1967 HEW ANN. REP. 141.
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In 1968, 73 hearings under Title VI resulted in termination of federal
funds in 63 school districts. 3 HEW's present policy of completely
terminating a school district's federal funds" leaves 121 school districts

at the start of the 1969-70 school year without any federal assistance.
In the instant case, after disposing of a procedural problem, 4 the

court concluded that the termination of funds by HEW was clearly
disruptive of the legislative scheme to avoid a punitive application of
the termination power. The court reasoned that segregation of faculty

and students did not lead to the conclusion that all the school district's
programs were constitutionally invalid. Addressing itself to whether

HEW was required to make findings of fact for each program, the
court indicated that since the statutory language is directed to the

federal agency administering the funds, the burden of limiting the
effects of termination is upon that agency.35 The court found that this
result was consonant with the purpose of limiting termination power,

which was to benefit the potential recipient of federal aid.3 Similarly,
in considering whether the term "program" referred to particular grant

statutes or to general categories of programs, the court again strictly
interpreted the statutory language. Since termination is limited "to the

particular program, or part thereof," and even if "program" referred
to a "school program," the expression "or part thereof" must refer
to the individual grant statutes within that "school program."''
31. 1968 HEW ANN. REP. 49-50. As of June 30, 1968, an accumulated total or only 96
districts had been actually barred from federal assistance because of noncompliance. Id. at 69.
32. Funds may be terminated upon a finding of discrimination in any one program. Note
29 supra.
33. N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1969, at 37, col. 6.
34. HEW had contended that since the petitioner had not raised the issue of wholesale
termination during the administrative proceedings, the question was not properly before the court.
The general rule concerning judicial review of decisions of an administrative agency is that courts
should not overturn administrative decisions unless the administrative body has erred against
objection made at the appropriate time. United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344
U.S. 33 (1952). An exception, however, provides that rules of procedure are devised to promote
and not to defeat the ends of justice. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1941). In applying the
exception to this case, the court indicated that justice required a decision on the merits since
HEW's action in the proceedings below made it impossible for the court properly to review the
case.
35. 414 F.2d at 1076. Legislative history was utilized by the court to reach this result. 110
CONG. REc. 13126 (1964).
36. The court reasoned that the burden of limiting termination should not be upon the state
and that the failure of a state to assert the affirmative defense of limited termination allows HEW
to deprive the actual beneficiaries of federal funds. This results in the perpetuation of an evil the
statute was designed to avoid. 414 F.2d at 1077.
37. Id. Noting that each relevant grant statute was designated "a program" by its own
statutory scheme, the court listed a number of grant statutes referred to in the Senate debates as
"programs." Id. at 1076-77.
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Finally, the court noted that the purpose of the statute was to prevent
the condemnation of lawful programs along with discriminatory ones.
Declaring that each program should receive its own "day in court,"
the court concluded that termination must be made only on a programby-program basis.
The instant case represents the first time a court has delineated the
scope of HEW's power of termination under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. HEW must now find discrimination in each school
program and can terminate funds only in the particular programs
found to be discriminatory. Previously, HEW's policy 38 was to
terminate all federal funds to a school district on finding discrimination
in any one specific program. The legislative history, however, ostensibly
39
affirms the congressional purpose of benefiting the ultimate recipient,
the student, and limiting the power of termination to the particular
discriminatory program40 so as not to punish the innocent along with
the guilty. Although recognizing the correctness of the court's
interpretation and the meritorious attempt to protect the student, the
instant case, upon closer examination, presents a number of serious
problems. Administratively, a program-by-program determination of
discrimination will place an enormous burden upon an understaffed
agency.4 ' With only about 100 staff members42 HEW-must evaluate
assurances, negotiate with school officials, and undertake field
investigations to determine compliance 3 in approximately 4,900southern school districts. The added work load will only exacerbate the
difficult conditions and essentially render section 602 ineffective when
applied to school desegregation. 4 Failure of Congress to appropriate
sufficient funds to satisfy additional expenses would subvert the
purpose and effect of Title VI.45 In states where federal funds are paid
38. Note 29 supra.
39. 110 CONG. REC. 7061 (1964) (remarks of Senator Pastore).
40. Senator Saltonstall (R.-Mass.) stated: "Federal funds will be cut off for only those
political entities or particular programs or parts of programs in which discrimination is
prohibited." 110 CONG. REC. 12689 (1964) (emphasis added); 110 CONG. REC. 15896 (1964)
(remarks of Congressman Celler (D.-N. Y.)). See note 21 supra.
41. U.S. COMI'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS. SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 1966-67, at 2022, 39, 97 (1967).
42. Id. at 22; U.S. CO.I'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS. SURVEY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE
SOUTHERN AND BORDER STATES 1965-66, at 25, 26 (1966).
43. U.S. Co.M.'n ON CIVIL RIGHTS. SURVEY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE
SOUTHERN AND BORDER STATES 1965-66, at 25, 26 (1966).
44. Note, supra note 29, at 346.
45. S. BAILEY & E. MOSHER. ESEA THE OFFICE OF EDUCATION ADMINISTERS A LAW 154,
155 (1968).
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directly to a state agency and are disbursed to individual districts by
the state in annual specific grants or on a piecemeal basis according

to need, many practical difficulties will arise in tracing each individual
expenditure to discrimination. It will be virtually impossible for HEW

to terminate aid if it is required to link each dollar cutoff to the
discriminatory action. 6
The court order exception,47 which exempts school districts under

court-approved desegregation plans from termination, has made school
desegregation a cooperative effort between HEW and the courts. This

had led to inconsistencies as to the appropriate standard for
desegregation,48 particularly when a court's standards are less stringent
than HEW's guidelines. For example, school districts often seek to
avoid more stringent HEW standards by obtaining a court order."
Moreover, HEW cannot use its own enforcement procedures to compel

school districts to comply with court orders."0 Recognizing this means
of avoidance, Congress enacted Title VI to mollify dissatisfaction with

judicial progress in achieving desegregation."' Judicial enforcement of
desegregation imposes a heavy case load on judges 2 and fails to achieve

prompt and uniform desegregation.

3

Furthermore, the courts are

unable to issue binding advisory opinions, and the contempt power is

not an effective means of enforcement against school board officials."
Although one commentator has indicated that the courts are better
suited to deal with the problem of desegregation,"5 the courts have

recognized the expertise of the HEW staff in working with school
districts. 5 Clearly, HEW's greatest inadequacy is lack of man46. Note, supra note 29, at 344, 345. For an additional administrative problem, see id. at
345 n. 108.
47. 45 C.F.R. § 80.4(c)(1) (1969).
48. Clark v. Board of Educ., 374 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1967) (refusing to adopt JefAfrson 1);
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 860 n.52 (5th Cir. 1966), affd en
bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,389 U.S. 840 (1967).
49. Comment, supra note 17, at 850.
50. Lee v. Board of Educ., 270 F. Supp. 859 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
51. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 847, 853-54 (5th Cir.
1966), aff d en bane. 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); U.S.
COMl'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS. I RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 239 (1967).
52. Dunn, supra note 9, at 42.
53. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 854-55 (5th Cir. 1966),
affden bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
54. Id. at 855.
55. Note, The Courts. HEW. and Southern School Desegregation, 77 YALE L.J. 321, 34243 (1967).
56. See. e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 896 (5th Cir.
1966), affd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Price v.
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power.57 Since 1964, however, the agency has been extremely successful
in achieving desegregation. 58- Moreover, HEW has a congressional
mandate 59 to bear the major responsibility of supervising school
desegregation. Utilization of HEW's guidelines has allowed Congress
to establish a national, uniform standard.
In order to cdrrect the inconsistencies in the present
administration of Title VI, the following possible solutions are
suggested: (1) Congress should appropriate funds sufficient to satisfy
HEW's administrative requirements; 0 (2) in an effort to establish
complete uniformity in desegregation standards, HEW should ask the
President to approve the guidelines giving them force of law.6 I Title VI
requires formal Presidential approval of all HEW's regulations in
order to give them effective legal authority. 2 Since the guidelines have
never been formally approved by the President, this action would
provide the guidelines with the necessary binding force of law; (3) in
conjunction with approval of the guidelines, HEW should repeal its
own court order exception in order to bring those school districts which
seek less stringent desegregation guidelines under the purview of
HEW's authority derived from Title VI. This would require all school
districts to adhere to HEW guidelines as the proper standard of
desegregation. Of course, courts would still serve as checks against any
arbitrary and unreasonable action by HEW, since school districts
whose funds were terminated could seek review of the administrative
decision under Title VI.
Board of Educ., 348 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1965); Singleton v. School Dist., 348 F.2d 729,
731 (5th Cir. 1965). In addition to clerical workers, the staff of HEW includes professional

educators who work with the school districts.
57. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
58. 1968 HEW ANN. REP. 69; N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1969, at 37, col. I. For a state-bystate status of classroom desegregation at the opening of the 1969-70 school year, see N.Y. Times

Sept. 2, 1969, at 37, col. 7.
59.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-4 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-5 (Supp. 1965-

67).
60. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 1966-67, at 97
(1967).
61. See note 22 supra.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I provides: "No [federal agency's] rule, regulation, or order shall
become effective unless and until approved by the President."
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Constitutional Law-Civil Rights-Section 1985(3) Does Not
Reach Private Conspiracies
Seeking damages in federal court for a racially motivated assault,'
Negro plaintiffs alleged that defendants had violated section 1985(3) of
Title 42 of the United States Code2 by conspiring to deprive them of
equal protection of the laws and equal privileges and immunities under
the laws. Plaintiffs contended that recent Supreme Court decisions3 had
impliedly extended section 1985(3) to include private discriminatory
acts. The District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
dismissed the action on the ground that the statute required a finding
of state involvement in the conspiracy.4 On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held, affirmed. Section 1985(3)
does not proscribe private conspiracies. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 410
F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969).
Section 1985(3) was enacted in 1871 as part of a broad antidiscrimination statute5 which was originally equipped with both civil
and criminal remedies. In 1883, however, the Supreme Court held
I. Believing one of the plaintiffs was a civil rights worker, the two white defendants stopped
the plaintiffs' car on the highway and threatened and beat the plaintiffs at gun-point.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1964): "If two or more persons in any State . , . conspire or go
in disguise on the highway . . . for the purpose of depriving . . . any person or class of persons
of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws ....
[l]n any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do
. . . any act in furtherance . . . of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or
property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages . ...
3. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966).
4. The decision of the district court is not reported.
5. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13: "[A]ny person who, under color of any law
. . . shall subject . . . any person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall . . . be liable to the party injured in any
action at law . . . . fl]f two or'more persons . . . shall conspire . . . to overthrow . . . the
government of the United States, or to levy war . . . or to oppose by force the authority of the
government of the United States, or . . . to prevent . . . the execution of any law . . . or .
to take . . . any property of the United States . . . or . . . to prevent any person from .
holding any office or . . . to deter any party or witness in any court of the United States from
attending such court, or . . . to influence the verdict . . . of any juror . . . or shall conspire...
or go in disguise upon the public highway or upon the premises of anotherfor the purpose...
of depriving any person . . . of the equal protection of the laws. or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws . . . each and every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a
high crime . . . . And if any one or more persons engaged in any such conspiracy shall do . .
any act in furtherance . . . of such conspiracy, whereby any person shall be injured in his person
or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States, the person so injured . . . may have. . . an action for the recovery of damages.
(Emphasis added).
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unconstitutional the part of the Act that made private conspiracies a
crime on the ground that it was "not warranted by any clause in the

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution."' Shortly thereafter, in
the Civil Rights CasesJ the Court firmly established the state action
doctrine by declaring that congressional power to protect fourteenth

amendment rights was limited to legislation for "correcting the
effects" of state laws and acts in violation of the amendment.' The

restrictive effect of the state action doctrine on federal power to enforce
civil rights was mitigated, however, by judicial recognition of a narrow

class of "federal rights" 9 that could be federally protected against
purely private acts. The delineation of these rights was achieved largely

through a case-by-case application of section 241 of Title 18 of the
United States Code,'" which imposes criminal sanctions on interference
with the "free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured
. . . by the Constitution or laws of the United States." In 1951,
Collins v. Hardyman" presented to.the Supreme Court the question

whether section 1985(3) would support a civil action for the inviasion
of a federally protected right by a purely private conspiracy.12 The
Court avoided the constitutional questions presented 13 and based its
6. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1883). The language of the statute held
unconstitutional is identical to § 1985(3) in its description of prohibited cbnspiracies.
Significantly, the same language held to include private conspiracies in Harris was held to exclude
private conspiracies in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951). See notes 11-13 infra and
accompanying text.
7. 109 U.S.3 (1883).
8. Id.at 11.
9. "Note, Fourteenth Amendment Congressional Power to Legislate Against Private
Discriminations: The Guest Case, 52 CORNELL L. REv. 586, 597 (1967): "Among these 'federally
protected rights' are the right to perfect a homestead claim, the right to vote in federal elections,
the right to be secure from unauthorized violence while in federal custody, the right to inform on
violations of federal law, and the right to enforce a federal court order."
10. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964): "If two or more persons conspire to . . .intimidate any
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States . . .or [i]f two or more persons go in disguise on the
highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or
enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured-It]hey shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both." (Emphasis added).
11. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
12. Collins involved the disruption of a political meeting called in order to petition Congress
to oppose the Marshall Plan. The Supreme Court "assume[d], without deciding, that the facts
pleaded show[ed] that defendants did deprive plaintiffs 'of having and exercising' a federal right
." Id.at 660.
13. The Court noted that potential issues were "congressional power under and apart from
the Fourteenth Amendment, the reserved power of the States, the content of rights derived from
national as distinguished from state citizenship, and the question of separability of the Act in its
application to those two classes of rights." Id. at 659.
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dismissal of the complaint upon an interpretation of the statute's
language. The Court held that although the statute proscribed
conspiracies to deprive another of equal protection or equal privileges
and immunities, "private discrimination is not inequality before the
law unless there is some manipulation of the law or its agencies to give
sanction or sanctuary for doing so."'" Three recent cases have seriously
challenged the state action doctrine and its implications for section
5 and United
1985(3). In United States v. Price,1
States v. Guest,"0 the
Supreme Court extended the scope of section 241 to include the
protection of fourteenth amendment rights against discriminatory state
action. 7 In Guest, however, six members of the Court, in two
concurring opinions, indicated that section 241 protected fourteenth
amendment rights from all conspiracies, and that state action was not
essential to sustain the cause of action. 8 Likewise, in Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 9 the Court held that a long-dormant statute proscribing
purely private discrimination in the sale of housing was a constitutional
exercise of congressional enforcement power under the thirteenth
amendment. 0
In the instant case, the court held that since the majority opinion
in Guest had required and found state action to support its holding,
the case "on its merits [did] not abolish state action."', Likewise,
Mayer could not be held to authorize the extention of congressional
enforcement power under the fourteenth amendment because it
concerned a statute enacted pursuant to the thirteenth amendment. The
court further held that the language of section 1985(3), as construed
by the Supreme Court in Collins," was limited by its own terms to
conspiracies in which there was state involvement. Thus, even granting
14. Id. at 661.
15. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
16. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
17. Section 241 had previously been limited to the protection of "federal rights." See note
9 supra and accompanying text.

18.

383 U.S. at 761 (Clark, Black & Fortas, JJ., concurring); Id. at 774 (Brennan, Warren

& Douglas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
19. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).

20.

Both the majority opinion in Mayer and Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Guest

quoted Chief Justice Marshall's classic test of the constitutionality of congressional enactments:

"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with
the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." McCullock v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
21. 410 F.2dat820.
22. See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
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congressional power to reach purely private conspiracies to invade
fourteenth amendment rights, such conspiracies were not within the
ambit of section 1985 (3).
Although justified by stare decisis, the instant court's restrictive
reading of section 1985(3) opposes a definite trend to expand federal
jurisdiction over civil rights violations. 23 Contrary to the holding in
Collins, which seems to have been dictated by a desire to avoid the
constitutional issues presented,2 4 the language of section 1985(3)
supports a more liberal reading. Section 1985(3) and section 241 both
refer to men going "in disguise on the highway" 25 and thus indicate a
clear congressional intent to reach the private discriminatory acts of
the Ku Klux Klan. Since the Act from which section 1985(3) was
derived 21 contained another section that provided a civil remedy for
discriminatory acts "under color of any law, 27 the omission of this
phrase from the section that is now 1985(3) was almost certainly not
accidental. Therefore, an interpretation of section 1985(3) that included
private acts within its scope would be consonant with the statute's
language. If such an interpretation were merged with the reasoning of
the concurring opinions in Guest, section 1985(3) would become an
effective civil counterpart to section 241. Since the weight of the
evidence required to find civil liability is less than that required to
impose a criminal sanction, litigation under 1985(3) might succeed
where a criminal prosecution under section 241 could not. In addition,
the prospect of recovery would tend to encourage litigation of those
cases that otherwise might never be adjudicated. On the other hand,
such a result would attribute additional and ill-defined powers to the
federal government, raise serious questions regarding the state-federal
balance of power, and increase the amount of litigation in federal
courts. Since it is doubtful that the existence of a federal statute
providing a civil remedy for private discrimination would add much to
the deterrent effect of present state and federal laws, the primary
function of such a statute would be compensatory. This function, in
theory at least, can be adequately exercised by the states under existing
laws. Furthermore, the danger of discriminatory state inaction is not
a significant factor because the initiative in a civil action rests with the
23. E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). See also cases cited note 3 supra.
24. See notes 11-14supra and accompanying text.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1964); 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964). See notes 2 & 10 supra and

accompanying text.
26.
27.

Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. See note 5supra.
Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (now 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964)).
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injured. party. Thus, although the current interpretation of section
1985(3) is not in accord with the legislative intent, major problems
would result from its rejuvenation. Such practical objections should
not, however, prevent the courts from according the statute the scope
that Congress intended.
Constitutional Law-Criminal Procedure-Sixth Amendment
Does Not Require Right to Counsel for In-Custody Suspects at
Photographic Identifications.
Eighteen months after a savings association was robbed, defendant
was apprehended and placed in a lineup. During the lineup proceedings,
defendant was represented by counsel,' and certain photographs were
taken. Subsequently, the photographs were privately shown, 2 in the
absence of defendant's counsel, to witnesses who were not present at
the lineup. Although none of the witnesses was able to identify the
defendant at his trial,3 pri6r photographic identifications4 were
admitted over defendant's objection that the absence of counsel at the
private pre-trial exhibition of the lineup photographs was a violation
of his sixth amendment rights.5 On appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, held, affirmed. The sixth
amendment does not require the presence of counsel for an
apprehended suspect at an identification proceeding where photographs
of the suspect in a lineup are displayed. United States v. Collins, 416
F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1969).
The sixth amendment' guarantees the right to assistance of counsel
for every criminal defendant. The Supreme Court has held that this
right attaches at any "critical stage" 7 of the prosecution if the absence
i.

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), requires that a suspect be represented by

counsel at a lineup to insure his right to a fair trial. See also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263

(1967).
2.

Defendant was in custody at the time the photographs were shown.

3. During the 10 month interval between the lineup and the trial, the defendant suffered a
considerable weight loss, dropping from 250 to 175 pounds.
4. One witness was able to identify defendant at the lineup; two witnesses identified him

from photographs; and a fourth witness was unable to identify the accused from either the lineup
or the photographs.

5. Both the trial judge and the defense counsel extensively cross-examined the witnesses, in
the absence of the jury, to ascertain whether there had been any improprieties in the identification
process.
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. Vl. See Note, The Right to Effective Counsel in Criminal Cases,
18 VAND. L. REv. 1920 (1965).

7. The Supreme Court has specifically required the presence of counsel at various critical
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of counsel might derogate the accused's right to a fair trial. In United
States v. Wade' and Gilbert v. California,9 the Court held that lineup
identifications were critical stages requiring the presence of counsel.
The Court reasoned that since this type of identification process "is
peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which
might seriously, even critically, derogate from a fair trial,"' 0 the
presence of counsel could reduce the possibility of prejudice to an
accused." In Simmons v. United States, 2 however, the Supreme Court
refused to extend the critical stage doctrine to photographic
identifications when the suspect is not in custody. 3 The Court reasoned
that such identification procedures were necessary for swift and
effective law enforcement.
In the instant case, the court held that Wade and Gilbert were not
controlling since they protected an accused from unrestrainable
suggestion in a congregation of persons. The court reasoned that since
the defendant was represented by counsel at an impartial lineup, the
subsequent display of photographs of that lineup was also impartial.
The court noted, however, that the identification proceeding lacked
conditions embracing the apprehensions of a lineup. Acknowledging
that some non-lineup identifications could conceivably be unfair, the
court found that no prejudicial circumstances were evident in this
instance." One judge, dissenting,'5 maintained that the display of lineup
stages, including: the arraignment, Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); certain preliminary
hearings, White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); secret interrogation prior to arraignment,
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); custodial interrogation, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966); and the trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). An accused, however, may
waive his right to counsel at any time if the waiver is intelligently and understandingly made.
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
8. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). See Note, Right to Counsel at Pre-trialLineup, 63 Nw. U.L. REv.
251 (1968).
9. 388 U.S. 263 (1967). See Note, Lawi'ersand Lineups, 77 YALE L.J. 390 (1967).
10. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
II. The Court was troubled by the effect of secret interrogations and the inability of a
suspect's counsel to provide adequate representation at the trial without knowledge of what
actually transpired at the identification proceeding. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
229-35 (1967).
12. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
13. The Court recognized the dangers inherent in photographic identification but concluded
that the danger could be substantially lessened by cross-examination at trial. Id. at 383-84.
14. The court found "no intimation" in the trial record of any intentional or inadvertant
unfairness in the presentation of the photographs for identification. The court relied upon Stovall
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), for the proposition that a claimed violation of due process
"depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it."
15. United States v. Collins, 416 F.2d 696, 700 (4th Cir. 1969) (Winter, J., dissenting).
Judge Winter reasoned that photographic identifications of an in-custody suspect are clearly
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photographs was a critical stage since the issue of identification was
determined at that point.
In failing to deem the photographic identification of a suspect

already in custody a critical stage, the court misinterpreted the main
thrust of-Wade, Gilbert, and prior related decisions." Corporeal

identification is not completely reliable 17 even under the best conditions;
however, it is clearly superior to photographic identification." Any
identification process is susceptible to either intentional or inadvertant

suggestion. 9 Fairness at a lineup cannot be equated with fairness at a
subsequent showing of photographs of the lineup, since the verbal

comments and the manner of presenting the photographs may
substantially influence the result. 0 Although the Supreme Court in
Simmons advocated cross-examination at the trial to reveal

improprieties in a photographic identification, 21 it is doubtful that this
procedure alone provides an adequate safeguard. The absence of

counsel at the identification proceeding would seriously impair an
attorney's ability to attack the credibility of a witness and to discern
any possibilities of misidentification.22 Since most witnesses are not
aware of prejudical identification conditions and are not trained in the
detection of subliminal suggestion, subconscious influence may go
unnoticed.13 This problem would intensify if a substantial period of
distinguishable from similar identifications of a suspect who is still at large; therefore,
photographic identifications during custody require the presence of counsel.
16. See note 7 supra. The Court was primarily concerned with the effect of secret
interrogations. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 230 (1967). The Court indicated the
undesirable effects a group of people have on an identification proceeding, but did not base its
decision on this issue. See id. at 234; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 270 (1967). The Court
was also concerned with eliminating any potential for prejudice, and thereby preserving an
accused's right to a fair trial. United States v. Wade, supra at 229, 233, 236. The Court
recognized that the trial which determines the accused's fate may not be in the courtroom but at
the pretrial confrontation. Id. at 235.
17. See generally United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 n.6 (1967). For example, 17
people erroneously identified an innocent man as a bogus check artist. E. BORCtIARD.
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 1-6 (1932). Even relatives and close friends have made mistaken
identifications. P. WALL, EYE-VITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 13 (1965).
18. P. WALL, supra note 17, at 70.
19. See generally United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 n.7 (1967).
20. The number of photographs shown, the manner in which they are presented, physical
differences between the photographs, and any improper suggestions may substantially affect the
outcome of the identification proceedings. P. WALL. supra note 17, at 73-85.
21. 390 U.S. at 384. The trial court adopted this procedure. See note 5 supra. Many other
courts have likewise relied on cross-examination. See. e.g., State v. Tafoya, 454 P.2d 145 (Ariz.
1969); People v. Neal, 77 Cal. Rptr. 65 (Ct. App. 1969).
22. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226, 232 (1967).
23. See id. at 230. A primary cause of erroneous identification is the susceptibility of the
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time lapsed between the identification proceeding and the subsequent
trial.2 4 At the trial, therefore, an improper identification process may
appear to have been proper. Furthermore, Wade indicated that crossexamination is not an absolute assurance of accuracy and reliability in

an identification proceeding and that the primary concern must be the
prevention of unfairness and the lessening of the hazards of eyewitness
identification. 25 The instant court does not explain why a subsequent
lineup was not held. Inasmuch as the suspect was already in custody,

it would seem that a lineup could easily have been arranged.2 1 Since
photographic identification is proper only when corporeal identification
is impossible, the law enforcement authorities in the instant case
employed an identification procedure clearly inferior in reliability to
one which was available. If a suspect, in custody in the area of the
crime, 2s is denied the benefits of counsel at a photographic showing, the
29
Wade and Gilbert protections could easily be emasculated.

Unquestionably, most improper identifications are not the result of
deliberate police procedures designed to prejudice an accused; rather,
human mind to suggestive influences. P. WALL. supra note 17, at 9, 29-35, 40. Furthermore,
photographic identification is extremely susceptible to suggestion. Id. at 68-73.
24. In the instant case, the trial occurred 10 months after the photographs were shown.
25. 388 U.S. at 235.
26. Pittsburg, for example, averaged 3 lineups per week in 1967. Comment, Right to
Counsel at Police Identification Proceedings: A Problem in Implementation of an Expanding
Constitution, 29 U. Prr. L. REv. 65, 79 (1968).
27. Photographs present a two-dimensional image which is 'frozen" and often not similar
to the living, moving subject. P. WALL. supra note 17, at 70.
28. If a suspect is apprehended many miles from the crime, a difficult problem is presented.
For example, if a crime is committed in New York and a suspect is later apprehended in
California, it would be impractical to have counsel represent the suspect at a photographic
showing in New York only to have the suspect exonerated by the witnesses. On the other hand,
if the unrepresented suspect is identified through photographs, his rights may be prejudiced since
a subsequent corporeal identification proceeding in New York, at which counsel is present, would
likely have the same result. This would be especially true if the suspect is rapidly transported
across the country and the witnesses identify him shortly after the photographic showing. P.
WALL, supra note 17, at 68-70. See also McClain v. State, 444 S.W.2d 99 (Ark. 1969) (suspect
arrested in Louisiana but photographs identified in Arkansas); Commonwealth v. Geraway, 245
N.E.2d 423 (Mass. 1969) (Massachusetts photographic identification of suspect in prison in
Connecticut approved). A possible solution to the dilemma is to appoint a neutral party to
supervise all identification proceedings, either corporeal or photographic. Also, complete motion
picture or video-tape coverage of the lineup would provide the defense attorney with an
opportunity to scrutinize the procedure. The Supreme Court in Wade advocated legislation or
other regulations, such as those of local police departments, to eliminate risks of abuse and
unintentional suggestions. 388 U.S. at 239. See also 3 J. WIGMORE, EVMENCE § 786(a) (3d ed.
1940).
29. If an accused is identified by photograph as the guilty party, any subsequent corporeal
identification of the accused may be based upon the witness's recollection of the photograph
instead of the features of the guilty party. P. WALL. supra note 17, at 68-70.
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errors are caused by the dangers inherent in eyewitness identification.'"
In light of the potential for prejudice to an accused's rights, the added

burden of providing counsel seems relatively small. The presence of
counsel could hardly impede legitimate law enforcement and may assist
enforcement by avoiding improper identifications.3: The Supreme
Court has held that "Wade and Gilbert affect . . .all future cases

which involve confrontations for identification purposes conducted in
the absence of counsel. . ."1

".

The reasons advanced by the Supreme

Court for requiring the presence of counsel at a corporeal lineup also
apply to a photographic lineup of a suspect in custody.

for prejudice and misidentification is at least as

3

The potential

great, 31 and

the right

of an accused to a fair trial may be irretriveably lost if attendance of

counsel is not required.

Constitutional Law- Equal Protection-States May Not Require
More Than a Simple Majority to Authorize Local Bond Issues
and Tax Levies Through Popular Election
Plaintiffs, voters of Roane County, West Virginia, brought a class
action for'a declaratory judgment' that the State constitutional
requirements that county bond indebtedness and certain tax levies be
approved by 60 percent of the voters in a public election 2 violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution of the United States.3 In a
1968 election conducted by defendant Roane County Board of
30. See generally P. WALL. supra note 17. See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
235 (1967).
31. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 238 (1967).
32. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296 (1967) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court
further held that the exclusionary rules of Wade and Gilbert should be applied even though no
unfairness is present. Id. at 299.
33. The compelling arguments for photographic identification of at large suspects are not
applicable if the defendant is already in custody. See United States v. Collins, 416 F.2d 696,
701 (4th Cir. 1969) (Winter, J., dissenting); cf. United States v. Simmons, 390 U.S. 377, 384
(1968).
34. See P. WALL. supra note 17, at 66-89.
1. Plaintiffs also sought a mandamus to compel the Board of Education to authorize the
issuance of bonds and to impose the additional tax levy.
2. W.VA. CONsr. art. 10, § I requires that 60% of the local voters approve imposition of
additional tax levies and W. VA. CONsT. art. 10, § 8 lists the same 60% requirement for incurring
local bond indebtedness.
3. Plaintiffs also alleged that the vest Virginia state constitutional provision violated the
guarantee clause of the Federal Constitution. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4.
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Education, a majority4 of the voters of Roane County favored the
issuance of bonds and an additional tax levy to finance local school
improvement and construction.5 Plaintiffs, supporters of both
proposals, contended that their votes had been diluted since two
negative votes offset three positive votes and that this debasement
contravenes the mandate of "one man, one vote." Defendants argued
that the equal protection clause could not be construed to invalidate
the right to require a fractional vote of greater than a majority. The
use of fractional votes in state and federal constitutional provisions'
refutes any theory that simple majority rule is a constitutional
command. The trial court sustained defendant's motion for judgment
on the pleadings and dismissed the action. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of West Virginia, held, reversed. State action imposing a
requirement that more than a simple majority of voters must support
proposed local bond issuance and additional tax levies constitutes a
denial of equal protection. Lance v. Board of Education, 38 U.S.L.W.
2060 (No. 12809) (W. Va., filed July 8, 1969).
Although the distinction has never been clearly enunciated by the
Supreme C6urt, implementation of the equal protection clause has
resulted in the identification of two categories of discriminatory state
regulation. 7 Unequal treatment may be permissible in order to effect
valid state policy, particularly in the case of economic regulation, if
there is a reasonable basis for the classification,8 but a "compelling
4. Of the votes cast, 51.55% favored the issuance of bonds, and 51.51% supported the
additional tax levy.

5. There have been no new schools or major additions or improvements to existing schools
in Roane County since 1946. Lance v. Board of Educ., 38 U.S.L.W. 2060, opinion at 10 (No.
12809) (W. Va., filed July 8, 1969).
6. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (two-thirds vote of Senate for impeachment); art. I, § 5
(two-thirds of either House to exclude a member); art. I, § 7 (two-thirds to override Presidential

veto); art. II, § 2 (two-thirds concurrence of Senate to make treaties); art. V, (two-thirds of each
house and two-thirds of state legislatures to amend the Constitution). W. VA. CONST.art. 4, § 9

(two-thirds vote of Senate for impeachment); art. 6, § 13 (three-fifths vote of legislature to call
special session); art. 6, § 22 (two-thirds of legislature to consider other business during time set

aside for review of budget); art. 6, § 29 (four-fifths to dispense with reading of a bill); art. 6,
§ 30 (two-thirds to change the time when an act takes effect); art. 10, § 7 (three-fifths popular
vote to require special tax assessment); art. 14, § 2 (two-thirds of legislature to amend

constitution).
7.

For a discussion of the "two faces of equal protection," see R. MCKAY,

REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION

169-80 (1965).
8. "That a statute may discriminate in favor of a certain class does not render it arbitrary
if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction, or difference in state policy."
Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959); accord, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961) (upheld statute permitting only certain merchants to do business on Sunday).
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state interest" 9 must be shown to justify a denial of "basic civil rights
of man."'" The right to vote has been unequivocally categorized as a

fundamental right" which may be transgressed in only the limited
circumstances in which significant state policy requires the restriction.
Suffrage has been vigorously defended by the judiciary against any
attempt to debase the vote or prevent its free exercise; for example,
withholding the franchise from a class of otherwise qualified voters

through poll taxes, 2 white primaries,' 3 or gerrymandering" has been
condemned. More recently, the Supreme Court struck down state

statutes limiting eligible voters to those with an identifiable interest in
the matter under consideration. 5
6
Baker v. Carr"
and its progeny have examined the narrower

question of allowing disproportionate voting power in representation
elections. The constitutional standard that has now emerged dictates

that each legislator represent an equal number of the population, 1
whether the governmental unit is Congress," a state legislature," or a

local governing body." In denouncing vote dilution, early case language
suggested that the courts' concern lay more with the inequality of

voting power than with the unequal representation fostered by
malapportionment.2 ' Gray v. Sanders22 gave a clear indication that the

disapproval of dilution of votes had implications beyond questions of
9. Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
10. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (criminal
sterilization statute invalidated).
11. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964): "The right to vote freely for the candidate
of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike
at the heart of representative government."
12. Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
13. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
14. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
15. Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (eligible voters in school district
elections limited to owners or lessees of taxable realty located in the district or parents or
custodians of children enrolled in public schools); Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (only
"property taxpayers" allowed to vote on municipal bond issue).
16. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
17. Early decisions required apportionment on as nearly as practicable an equal population
basis, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), but the most recent Supreme Court holding
requires that a good-faith effort must be made to establish absolute equality in the number of
people that each congressman represents. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
18. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I (1964).
19. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
20. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
21. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964): "[Tlhe right of suffrage can be
denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise."
22. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
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mere legislative apportionment. At issue was the propriety of the
Georgia county-unit nominating system which resulted in less populous
areas being represented by proportionally more convention delegates
than counties with large populations.13 Although Gray was ultimately
decided on the basis of unequal representation, the case presented the
question whether votes may be weighed after they are cast.2 4 The Court
said the procedure was clearly unconstitutional since a qualified class
of voters may not be stripped of equality of voting power.2 5 The
Supreme Court has hinted that strict population equality might not be
all that is required to insure equal protection. The Court noted in Burns
v. Richardson2 1 that despite numerically equal representation, multimember districts may contravene equal protection rights if invidious
class discrimination characterizes the system. Accordingly, a multimember district scheme which statistically provided an equal number
of constituents for each representative, but which located a minority
group in a large district so that it constituted a relatively small
percentage of the population has been held by a lower court to dilute
27
the effective voting power of the minority.
In the instant case the court determined that the mandate of "one
man, one vote" extends beyond the reapportionment cases. General
language extolling equality of the vote was cited' from the
apportionment decisions 28 and Gray was heavily relied upon in
concluding that "one man, one vote" has been established as a general
principle without .qualification or exception. 29 The court found that the
West Virginia constitutional provisions gave "no" votes one and onehalf times the voting power of "yes" votes, thereby diluting "yes"
votes in contravention of the equal protection clause. If dilution or
debasement through a 60 percent requirement were allowed, there
would be no escape from the conclusion that the weight and force of
votes "may legally be debased and diluted to the point of total
extinction. ' 30 The dissent argued that "one man, one vote" can
rationally be viewed as applying only to apportionment, for if the
23. Counties with small populations received the same number of delegates, but as the
population increased the number of delegates allocated did not increase proportionally. Id. at 371-

73.
24. Id. at 381 (Stewart &Clark, JJ., concurring).
25. Id.
26.
27.

384 U.S. 73 (1966).
Chavis v. Whitcomb, Civil No. IP 69-C-23 (S.D. Ind., filed July 28, 1969), noted in
22 VAND. L. REV. 173 (1969).
28. See note 22 supra.
29. 38 U.S.L.W. 2060, opinion at 11-18 (No. 12809) (W. Va., filed July 8, 1969).

30. Id. at 19.
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majority view were correct, logically all provisions of the state
constitution requiring a two-thirds or three-fourths vote are likewise
invalid."
The case-by-case establishment of principles applicable to voting
rights has resulted in generalities that after a period of time must be
clearly delineated in their applicability. The issue facing the instant
court was whether the Supreme Court has been endeavoring to secure
the integrity of the individual's vote against class discrimination or
merely seeking to effect equal population representation in republican
institutions. The regularity with which the admonition against dilution
has appeared and the concern of the courts in the multi-member district
cases with effective voting power 32 seem to indicate that protection of
the vote is the object of the decisions. The Gray Court questioned how
one man can be given twice the vote of another simply because he lives
in a rural rather than an urban area.3 The West Virginia procedure
involves weighting a man's vote according to whether it is a "yes" or
"no" vote. The question is whether this after-the-fact weighting comes
within Gray. It may be argued that each man has as much voting
power as another prior to the balloting since he may vote either way;
therefore it is impossible to say that anyone is categorized and
discriminated against before the election, because the voter classifies
himself by choosing to vote "yes" or "no." In rebuttal it must be
pointed out that this line of reasoning ignores the fact that certain
segments of the population will have a vested interest in one side of any
given proposition. These people will be predisposed to vote in a
particular way to protect that interest. A 60 percent requirement for
the approval of additional property taxes, for instance, would favor
property owners since they can generally be expected to resist passage
of the measure.3 4 It cannot logically be urged that property owners are
31. 38 U.S.L.W. 2060, dissenting opinion at 10 (No. 12809) (W. Va., filed July 8, 1969). See
note 6 supra. Urging that the merits of the case should never have been reached, the dissent also

argued that a state court is powerless to declare provisions of its state constitution violative of the
Federal Constitution. The dissent reasoned that no court can declare invalid the document by

which it was created. Seemingly supportive pronouncements of other cases were quoted out of context in an effort to establish that only the people of a state may alter the state constitution. E.g.,
State ex rel. Smith v. Gore, 150 W. Va. 71, 77, 143 S.E.2d 791, 795 (1965), stated that "[t]his
basic organic law [the state constitution] can be altered or rewritten only in the manner provided
for therein." But this statement is made in upholding the superiority of a state constitution over
state legislative enactments-not federally guaranteed rights.
32. See notes 27 & 28 supra and accompanying text.

33.

Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963).

34.

On these grounds at least one writer has concluded that a proposed Washington state

constitutional amendment which would impose a three-fifths majority requirement for passage by
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a minority of the population and should be given more consideration

in order to protect their interests, especially in light of the decision in
Cipriano v. Hounia 35 in which the Supreme Court invalidated a state
law limiting eligible voters in tax elections to taxpayers. Clearly voters
should not be disenfranchised merely to subserve vested interests; the
fact of predisposition effectively establishes a class which is identifiable
prior to the ballot and which is discriminated against in the vote
counting procedure involved in a more-than-majority requirement. If

this type of classification constitutes unconstitutional discrimination in
apportionment, it should be no less offensive because the voters are
themselves making the law rather than selecting the lawmakers.3 6

In this "important area of human rights

3

7

invidious

discrimination against an identifiable class by dilution of votes will not
be allowed unless there is an overriding state or federal interest to be
served. While the boundaries of "invidious discrimination" are not

clearly defined, the multi-member district admonition of Burns and the
strong language of Reynolds and Gray indicate that any unnecessary

dilution of voting power will constitute invidious discrimination.
Indeed, in the apportionment area absolute equality is now the rule,
and there appears to be no reason why this test should not apply in
popular election cases. In the instant case, the dissent warned that the
majority's decision would mean the demise of all state constitutional

provisions requiring more than a majority for action.3 8 This
observation may be entirely correct with limited exception. If more

than a majority may not be required in a popular vote, there is little
local voters of an increased property tax would violate the equal protection clause. Note,
Constitutionalityof the Voting Provisions in the Seventeenth Amendment to the Washington
Constitution, 42 WASH. L. REv. 640 (1967). But cf. 65-66 Ops. WASH. ATT'Y GEN. No. 83
(1966), cited in id. at 641 n.4.
35. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
36. Note, supra note 34, at 646-47. But see Carroll County v. Smith, Ill U.S. 556 (1884),
which implies that a state may require a majority of all registered voters to pass a measure rather
than a majority of those voting. This would have the effect of permitting dilution of votes because
some voters choose not to exercise the franchise; therefore, more than a majority would be needed
to pass any given measure. Carroll stated that this view is not preferred, and in light of
contemporary developments in interpretation of equal protection, the Supreme Court should have
no trouble skirting Carroll as outdated by modern policy standards. Note, supra note 34, at 64344.
37. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964), citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 536 (1942).
38. 38 U.S.L.W. 2060, dissenting opinion at 10 (No. 12809) (W. Va., filed July 8, 1969)
(Haymond, J., dissenting). The dissent's initial argument that a state court may not declare its
own constitution unconstitutional will not be treated except to observe that while there is a superficial appeal to logic inherent in the proposition, it is incredible to urge that, under these circumstances, individual rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution cannot be enforced in state
courts.
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justification for imposing it in the legislature which is representative of
the people. Moreover, such a procedure may be shown to contravene
the requirement of equal population representation. If a proposition
requires two-thirds majority to pass the legislature and it may be shown
that a group of legislators is predisposed to vote "no," then these men
have been given more voting power than their colleagues. On that issue
their constituents have greater representation than those of legislators
inclined to vote "yes," and inequality prevails. Perhaps legislative
functions which are oriented toward internal housekeeping do not
present the opportunity for predisposition that more substantive
questions afford; therefore, no identifiable class would exist prior to the
vote and consequently no discrimination except after the fact. Whether
this kind of weighting is vulnerable to an equal protection argument is
yet to be determined, but to the extent that our assumptions in the
popular vote cases are apposite, more than a majority should not be
required in the legislature. Theoretically this would apply to Congress
except for those more-than-majority requirements expressly set forth in
the Constitution. While provisions of the Constitution itself obviously
may not be declared unconstitutional, it is entirely possible that a
contemporary interpretation of the equal protection clause may be
inconsistent with certain other provisions of the Constitution. This does
not necessarily mean that the new equal protection construction is
incorrect, but may indicate that the contrary provisions should be
viewed as creatures of the era in which people feared the "tyranny of
the majority." Much the same reasoning has been employed by the
Supreme Court in explaining the ideological inconsistency between
their apportionment decisions and the institution of the electoral
college. The "federal analogy" urged in support of malapportionment
was rejected there' as it should be here. The Supreme Court has never
allowed and need not now allow provisions grounded in history to serve
to abort the application of a contemporary conception of equal
protection wherever the Constitution does not expressly forbid it.
Under present guidelines it appears that few more-than-majority
provisions will survive. While the need for governmental stability may
provide the requisite "compelling state interest" to justify making the
constitutional amendment process difficult, the defensibility of other
reasons for the imposition is less obvious. Assuming that it is
39. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 377-78 (1963) (acknowledging the inconsistency and
explaining that the historical reasons for the electoral college have been supplanted by emphasis
on individual rights in modern political theory).
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determined that the existing limitations on simple majority rule should
be preserved, a new standard must emerge if the import of "compelling
state interest" is not to be absurdly distorted. The necessity of
formulating a new test to vindicate the voting requirements under
scrutiny will compel a reevaluation and balancing of state interests and
individual rights. Whether any or all more-than-majority requirements
endure depends on the policies derived from this balancing process.

Constitutional Law-Reapportionment-Multi-Member Districts
Which Minimize the Effects of an Identifiable Minority Group's
Vote are Unconstitutional
Plaintiffs,' registered voters in a multi-member, at-large voting
district, brought an action against the Governor of Indiana 2 seeking a
decree that the at-large provisions of the Indiana Acts of 19651 are
unconstitutional and an order directing a proper legislative
apportionment of Marion County. The complaint alleged that the
result of electing Marion County's state legislators at-large is to dilute
the vote of a cognizable racial minority group within the county in
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.,
Indiana denied that the dilution of any minority's vote occurred since
the plaintiffs were a part of the constituency of each Marion County
legislator; therefore each legislator must be somewhat responsive to
each voter's interests. On trial, before a three-judge panel in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, held,
1. There were 6 plaintiffs in this case. Andrew Ramsey and Mason Bryant were the only
plaintiffs who resided in the ghetto area as defined by the court, infra note 20. The court
concerned itself mainly with the specific complaint that the ghetto residents' vote was being
cancelled and refused to grant the relief prayed for by the other plaintiffs.
2. The complaint originally purported to be a class action against the Indiana General
Assembly and its individual members. The court granted plaintiffs' motion to join Edgar D.
Whitcomb, Governor of the State of Indiana. The court then granted defendants' motion to
dismiss as to the Indiana General Assembly and its individual members.
3. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 34-102, 104 (Burns Supp. 1968) (originally enacted as Indiana Acts
of 1965, ch. 4, § 3, ch. 5, § 3 (2d Spec. Sess.).
4. The possibility of a multi-member apportionment scheme coupled with at-large voting
operating to minimize the voting strength of a minority is easy to visualize. Suppose that in a
county entitled to elect 10 representatives, the members of one political party, or racial minority
group, number 40% of the population, while the other political party or racial group can control
60% of the population. With at-large voting in the county, the majority will elect all 10 and the
minority will elect none. If the county is divided into 10 equal populationsingle-member districts,
and the minority is not spread over all 10, an apportionment might be obtained which reflects
the relative strength of the parties, or 6-4.
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judgment for the plaintiffs. When the record demonstrates that a multimember apportionment scheme, in which all legislators are nominated
and elected at-large, operates to minimize or cancel out the voting
strength of an identifiable minority of the population, such scheme is
unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Chavis v. Whitcomb,

-

F. Supp.

-

(S.D. Ind.

1969).
The Supreme Court first dealt'with the merits of a racial
gerrymander in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,5 but the drawing of municipal
lines to exclude Negro voters was held to be a violation of the fifteenth,
not the fourteenth, amendment. Only Mr. Justice Whittaker thought
that the case presented a violation of fourteenth amendment equal
protection rights.' The majority, relying on Colegrove v. Green,7 felt
that jurisdiction on fourteenth amendment grounds was barred because
voting district apportionment was a political question, not a case or
controversy as required by article III, section two of the Constitution.
In Baker v. Carr,8 the Court, overruling the precedent of Colegrove,
held that citizens asserting that their votes were diluted or minimized
in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
presented a justiciable issue within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
The Court held in Reynolds v. Sims9 that the fourteenth amendment
requires that both houses of a bicameral state legislature be
apportioned substantially on a population basis in order to prevent the
dilution of any citizen's vote.'0 The case of Fortson v. Dorsey" first
5.

364 U.S. 339 (1960).

6.

Id. at 349.

7.
8.

328 U.S. 549 (1946).
369 U.S. 186 (1962).

9. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Companion cases to Reynolds: WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633
(1964); Lucas v. Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Maryland Committee for Fair Representation

v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377
U.S. 695 (1964). The Court held unconstitutional the apportionment statutes of New York,

Colorado, Maryland, Virginia, and Delaware respectively along with the Alabama statute in
Reynolds.
10. However, the Court in Reynolds rejected the notion that equal protection necessarily

requires the formation of single-member districts. In discussing that problem the Court said:
"One body could be composed of single-member districts while the other could have at least some

multi-member districts." 377 U.S. at 577. There has been much discussion to the effect that
mixed multi-member and single-member districts operate in favor of the multi-member district

resident since he will be influencing the vote of more legislators in a position to cast the deciding
ballot on any given legislative vote. Mathematical analysis leads to the conclusion that such

representation more than overcomes the apparent deficiency that a legislator elected from a multimember district must be responsible to more constituents. Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral
Districts-Do They Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle,75 YALe L.J. 1309 (1966). See
note 24 infra.
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raised the issue of whether multi-member districts, under the equal
protection guidelines of Baker and Rewnolds, diluted the vote of
minority groups. 12 In reversing the lower court decision, the Court
stated that multi-member districts are not a per se violation of any
minority's equal protection rights, but it did not deny the possibility
that a multi-member.apportionment scheme could, under the
circumstances of a particular case, unconstitutionally'minimize the
voting weight of a cognizable minority. 13 In Burns v. Richardson"4 the
Court decided that a multi-member districting scheme which functions,
either casually or purposefully, to minimize a cognizable minority's
voting strength, would constitute a violation of that minority's
fourteenth amendment equal protection rights. In Burns, the Court
'noted that the presence of this minimization must be established, not
as a matter of speculation, but as a demonstrable reality. 5 The Court
then outlined certain conditions which, if present, would help establish
dilution of a minority's voting strength. These conditions and their
effects are as follows: (1)If the percentage of legislators elected in the
multi-member district is large in comparison with the total number of
legislators, it may indicate that the district is too large for legislators
effectively to represent diverse interests within it. (2) If the legislators
are residentially concentrated within a small geographic section of a
multi-member district, they might tend to represent the uniform ideas
and interests of that local area rather than the diverse interests of the
entire district. (3) If each multi-member district serves as the exclusive
political base from which both senators and representatives are elected,
then the different bases of representation between the houses of a
bicameral legislature are no longer present; this would result in a lesser
chance for diverse representation in both houses of a legislature since
the same majority would elect representatives to both houses from the
11. 379 U.S. 433 (1965). Appellees in Fortson neither argued nor attempted to prove beyond
their mere contention that multi-member districts are unconstitutional.

12. The problem had been collaterally discussed in a previous case. At that time the Court
talked about the adverse effects of multi-member districts. Lucas v. Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 731

(1964).
13.

379 U.S. at 439. The Fortson Court emphasized that its holding was limited to the

narrow question presented by the case: the validity on its face of a multi-member constituency
feature of a state legislative apportionment statute. The Court warned that its "opinion is not to
be understood to say that in all instances or under all circumstances such a system . . . will
comport with the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause."
14. 384 U.S. 73 (1966).

15. This is the Court's own citation to this point. Cf McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961).
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same district." Kilgarlin v. Hill 7 upheld the standards of Burns as the
principles for determining the presence of unconstitutional dilution of

a minority's vote.'
In the instant case, the court noted that the first requirement in

proving the existence of unconstitutional discrimination is to establish
an identifiable racial minority against whom the discrimination
operates. Using mathematical tables to demonstrate social, economic,
and housing characteristics of the ghetto residents, 9 the court
concluded that those residents had common interests of substantive law

which diverge significantly from the interests of non-ghetto residents."0

These common interests, shared by the Negroes in the Marion County

ghetto, made them, the court said, an identifiable racial minority. After
establishing this identifiable group, the court described how the weight
of that group's vote is severely minimized both in the primaries and in
the general election. The court said the minimization resulted from the
strong control over the nomination of candidates by the two major

political parties which are effectively controlled by non-ghetto
residents. Therefore, the Negro voters were never presented with the

opportunity of voting for a representative proportion of legislators who
advocate the common interests shared only by the ghetto residents. The

court further noted that legislators were hesitant to advocate the
interests of ghetto residents once elected even though they might believe

those interests to be proper. In part this was a result of voters accepting
the recommendations of their party in the primary and the general
16. 384 U.S. at 88. The Court implied that the proving of these 3 conditions was not a
conclusive showing of discrimination, but that it would only make the invidious minimizing effect
easier to demonstrate.
17. 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
18. Id. at 125 n.3. Even though the standards of Burns were upheld in that case, the Court
did not find them present, nor did it find dilution of the minority's vote.
19. Before describing the various characteristics of these ghetto residents, the court,
realizing that'the resolution of the case depended in large part on identifying the injured minority
groups, analyzed the word "ghetto" carefully and adopted this definition: "A primarily
residential section of an urban area characterized by a higher relative density of population and
a higher relative proportion of substandard housing than in the overall metropolitan area which
is inhabited predominantly by members of a racial, ethnic, or other minority group, most of
whom are of lower socioeconomic status than the prevailing status in the metropolitan area and
whose residence in the section is often the result of social, legal, or economic restrictions or
F. Supp. at.
custom."
20. Those areas of substantive law that the court found common to the ghetto residents
were housing regulations, sanitation, welfare programs (ADC, medical care, etc.), garnishment
statutes, unemployment compensation, urban renewal and rehabilitation, unemployment training,
law enforcement problems, raising the quality of education, and anti-discrimination measures.
-

F. Supp. at

_,

.
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election because the large number of candidates presented to the public
caused voter confusion and made intelligent, issue-conscious voting
almost impossible. The court concluded that the legislators, realizing
this, accepted the position of the party on any given issue in order to
secure nomination and election. Therefore, party control over
nominations and elections tends to dominate the legislators' actions
once elected. Relying on the proposition that a sizeable minority has
interests that diverge from the majority non-ghetto residents, it
followed that a legislator who represented those interests would, by
definition, be deviating from the majority of his party.21 The court
pointed out that the partial resporisiveness of all Marion County
legislators to the ghetto interests would not be equal to the total
responsiveness of the proportionate number of legislators to those same
interests. Indeed, partial responsiveness to such a large minority was
so minimal in Marion County that it constituted an actual dilution of
that minority's vote.
Following its discussion of the minimizing effects of the party
organizations' control, the court turned to the application of the three
conditions outlined in Burns as standards to help prove the presence
of discrimination in a multi-member district. First, Marion County
elects fifteen and sixteen percent of the state representatives and state
senators respectively, a number too large for one district in relation-to
the total number of Indiana legislators. Secondly, the court used
mathematical tables to show that 14.6 percent of the population that
reside in the upper middle-class, predominantly white, suburban
Washington Township have 52.27 percent of the senators and 41.79
percent of the representatiVes living in their township, while 41.13
percent of the population, who reside in Center Township (which
includes the Negro ghetto) have only 9.5 percent of the senators and
17.91 percent of the representatives.22 Thirdly, in Indiana, both houses
of the General Assembly are characterized by the same multi-member
districts. The presence of these conditions and the effects they have on
the weight of a minority group's vote, coupled with the diluting effect
on the minority's vote by the strong, non-ghetto dominated party
organizations demonstrated that the Marion County multi-member
district invidiously discriminated against the cognizable minority group
21. The court noted that since 1920 only a little more than 1% of the Indiana General
Assembly candidates from Marion County had been elected from the party that did not prevail.
22. The court pointed out that the ghetto; p61iulation of Center Township is sufficient by
itself to elect 2 representatives and one senator if itwas districted under the single-member plan.
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present within that county. Concluding from additional evidence 3 that
multi-member districts give their constituents a greater voice in the

legislature than the constituents of single-member districts, the court
directed the Indiana General Assembly to redistrict the entire state as

to both houses and further recommended that it give strong
consideration to the principle of uniform population districts in making
24
its apportionment scheme.
The inference of Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims was that
greater equality of representation would be the ultimate result of the

equal protection apportionment litigation. But the remedies effected by
those decisions were concerned with equal protection on the strict

numerical basis of "one man, one vote." This strict numerical equality
ignores the fact that people can be treated "equally" in different

ways. 25 When consolidation of a minority in a multi-member voting
23. Relying on Banzhaf, supra note 10, the court in the instant case concluded that "where
District A elects one representative from two candidates and District B, which is eight times as
populous as District A, elects eight representatives from sixteen candidates . . . [and] [w]hen the
representatives of a multi-member district vote as a bloc in a legislative body, each representative's
vote has a greater weight than that of a representative from a single-member district. . . . [A]s
each member of the bloc delegation is responsible to the voter majority who elected the whole,
each Marion County voter has a greater voice in the legislature, having more legislators to speak
for him than does a comparable voter in the. . . single-member . . . district[s]." F. Supp.
at __-

24. The court in the instant case noted that the uniform population district "is one method
of curing defects in unequal representation. The principle is that equal numbers of persons should
be represented by equal numbers of legislators in each district of a legislative body. . . . While
application of the uniform district principle would require all districts to be equal in population
and elect equal numbers of legislators from each uniform district, it does not require singlemember districts. For example, the Indiana House of Representatives could consist of 100
districts electing one representative each, fifty districts with two representatives each . . . . The
maximum size of the uniform districts should, of course, not be so large as to create the improper
dilution of minority group voting found in the instant case." F. Supp. at -.
25. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1164 (1969):
"If all men were identical-similar in every respect except that they were distinct individuals-the
formal rule of equal treatment would be sufficient; all would then deserve identical treatment in
terms of benefits conferred and burdens imposed. It is obvious, however, that men are not similar
in all respects. Not only are they different in their physical characteristics, social and economic
positions, and other relatively objective properties, but they differ also in subjective preferences,
values, and tastes. Simply to say that it is right to treat two people equally rather than unequally
is meaningless in this context, since to treat two people equally in one respect will always be to
treat them unequally in others. For instance if A likes only scotch and B only bourbon, to give
each a bottle of scotch treats them alike with respect to what they are given, but not with respect
to 'what they would have preferred. Likewise if C has red hair but D does not, then to give a
football to C but not to D treats them equally with regard to the rule that only red-haired people
get footballs, but unequally with regard to the goods that each receives.
It becomes necessary, then, in order to apply the formal equality principle, to determine in
what respects men are similar and to decide which of these are relevant to the kind of treatment
they should receive ...
"
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district dilutes that minority's vote, even though the district is equally
represented on the "one man, one vote" basis, it is apparent that a
more proportional basis of equality is needed. The Court, in Fortson
and Burns, laid down certain conditions, the presence of which
demonstrates an adverse effect on a minority's ability to secure such
proportional representation. This signaled the willingness of the Court
to expand the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
include the concept of proportional equality. The thrust of the instant
case is not only that it has proved, using the standards outlined in
Fortson and Burns, that those factors exist in the multi-member district
of Marion County, and that they substantially affect the ghetto
minority's ability to secure proportional representation, but also that
it allows an inference that these factors exist wherever an at-large,
multi-member district includes a ghetto within its boundaries. This
inference leads to the presumption that this type of apportionment
scheme will deny proportional representation and violate the equal
protection clause. The presence of this invidious discrimination creates
the need for a remedial apportionment plan. The instant court in its
order suggested the legislature give strong consideration to the uniform
population principle. The application of this principle in its extreme,
so as to create single-member districts, seems best suited for
eliminating the inequity. Due to the smaller geographic area of a singlemember district, the interests would tend to be less diverse than in a
larger multi-member district, thus allowing more responsive
representation to the particular interests within a district. This would
encourage more responsible voter participation because the candidates
would seek support based on the substance of those interests rather
than a county-wide party indorsement. It is possible that pursuant to
this plan, the ghetto might be split by the legislature in such a way that
each third would be in three separate single-member districts; again the
identifiable racial group would be the numerical minority.
To ensure the minority proportionate representation and to avoid
dividing the ghetto among a number of voting districts, the legislature
could be tempted to form the districts along strict racial lines. This
process would group the homogeneous population of the ghetto in the
single-member district, ensuring the election of representatives totally
responsive to the ghetto interests. Segregation in all other instances has
been a detriment to the welfare of the ghetto dweller. Nevertheless,
segregation may actually help to remedy the injustice presented in the
instant case by giving the minority a larger voice in the decisionmaking process. Therefore, the traditional detriments of segregation
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must be balanced against the benefits of greater political powers. It is
submitted that to define voting districts in terms of race is an artificial
distinction because the characteristics of poverty shared by the ghetto
minority are common to other groups in the population who are not
Negro.2 6 If Negroes see their only base of political power concentrated
in the ghetto they will be inclined to remain in the ghetto to keep that
power. Also, political segregation might reinforce segregation in areas
of education and housing which the Supreme Court has already found
to be in opposition to the policy of integration of the races in this
country. Therefore single-member districts should not be drawn along
racial lines, but should be drawn with no particular race or interest in
mind. The ghetto minority could still exert greater pressure in the
single-member district than in the multi-member district because there
are fewer divergent interests in the geographically smaller district. With
fewer divergent interests present, the interests of the ghetto acquire
more than that minimal influence enjoyed by its voting power on a
countywide basis.2 The legislature should not interpret the court order
as recommending a racially structured political subdivision. It is felt
that the inherent characteristics of the uniform population, singlemember district will .eliminate the invidious discrimination found in
multi-member districts. To go further and consciously draw the new
districts along racial boundaries will only serve to promote the
undesired effects of segregation.

Constitutional Law-State Reporting System Which Gathered
Information on Individuals and Organizations Involved in Civil
Disturbances, Protests, and Demonstrations Violated the First
Amendment
Seeking a declaratory judgment against the Attorney General of
New Jersey, the NAACP and several individuals who were active in
civil rights protest alleged that the use of a state-wide reporting
system,1 which gathered information about demonstrators participating
26.

race. To
problems
27.
28.

See note 21 supra. Primarily, the areas of substantive law are problems of poverty, not

provide a means that insures only the Negroes an opportunity to have their poverty
represented discriminates against the poor whites in Marion County.
E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Cf R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 124-51 (1956).

1. Pursuant to a conference between Governor Hughes and mayors of various New Jersey
cities, the Attorney General urged local police departments to employ two forms distributed by

the State Police Central Security Unit and to return completed reports to the state authorities
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in civil disturbances, violated their first amendment rights. 2 The
plaintiffs contended that since any public gathering could qualify for a
write-up and entry into the central files, the system would

unconstitutionally deter individuals from exercising their freedom of
expression. The Attorney General maintained that there was a

relationship between individuals and organizations who engage in
protest demonstrations and civil disorders and that the reporting

system facilitated a legitimate state interest in preventing such
disturbances.3 The Superior Court of New Jersey for Hudson County,
held, judgment for plaintiffs. The New Jersey central intelligence

system was unconstitutional because its very existence might
reasonably be expected to restrict the exercise of freedoms guaranteed

by the first amendment. Anderson v. Sills, 256 A.2d 298 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1969).

Although the Supreme Court has never specifically articulated a
right to anonymity' in the exercise of first amendment freedoms, the

Court, in reviewing investigation of associational activities, has
recognized the right to participate anonymously in lawful group
activity without prior restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.5 The
for evaluation and dissemination. One form solicited the names and addresses of any
organizations, groups, and leaders involved in any anticipated or completed "civil disturbance,
riot, rally, protest, demonstration, march, confrontation, etc." It also required a general
statement of the nature and purpose of the incident and a characterization of the group involved
as "Left wing, Right wing, Civil Rights, Militant, Nationalistic, Pacifist, Religious, Black Power,
Ku Klux Klan, Extremist, etc." The second form solicited information concerning individuals
who were possibly connected with potential civil disorders and required extensive personal data
concerning the subject, his spouse, employer, and associates. Anderson v. Sills, 256 A.2d 298,
301, apps. A&Bat 305-13 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1969).
2, The court treated the rights associated with the first amendment collectively.
Consequently, the specific first amendment rights asserted by the plaintiffs cannot be determined
from the opinion.
3. The violence which characterized the summer of 1967 was acute in New Jersey. The city
of Newark suffered $10.2 million damages and 23 persons killed. Furthermore, order was restored
only after the National Guard occupied the city for three days. Violent rioting also broke out in
Elizabeth, Englewood, Plainfield, and Jersey City. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 30-46 (1968). Surveys conducted under the direction of the
Kerner Commission indicated that many citizens believed that the riots were conspiratorial or
criminal in nature and were the inevitable consequence of protests. Also, over half of the people
surveyed did not approve of protest in general and believed that more police control was the best
preventive action for authorities. SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 47-59,96 (1968).
4. Anonymity is a state of privacy in the sense of an individual being free from
identification and surveillance of his public activity. See Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom:
Issues and Proposalsfor the 1970's, Part I, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1003, 1021 (1966).
5. The Supreme Court has also recognized the right to anonymity in public expression.
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (ordinance requiring the names and addresses of persons
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concept was tentatively recognized in Watkins v. United States,, when
the Court refused to permit the exercise of investigative power to
expose private activities. More specifically, the Court has prohibited
vague and overbroad 7 investigations into the membership of the
NAACP and has consistently upheld the privilege of individuals to
keep private their activities with dissident or unpopular groups.' In
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,9 the Court determined that if
an investigation might possibly have a "deterrent effect'" on the free
exercise of first amendment activity, the interference is unconstitutional
unless the state demonstrates an absolute interest in investigating the
activity. The Court has acknowledged that the government has a
paramount interest in preserving national security and in pursuing this
who prepared, distributed, or sponsored handbills is unconstitutional). See Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Heilberg v. Fixa, 236 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
6. 354 U.S. 178, 198-99 (1957) (requiring a clear delegation of congressional authority to
force a witness to disclose information concerning members of the Communift Party). See Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). "Mhe inviolability of privacy belonging to a citizen's
political loyalties has .
overwhelming . . . importance to the well-being of our kind of
society.
...
Id. at 265.
. 7. Vagueness and overbreadth are distinct concepts, but have the
same general effect since
both deter constitutionally protected conduct. A vague statute fails either to specify prohibited
conduct, or to guide intervention by law enforcement officials. Consequently, the individual never
knows when he is subject to criminal sanctions. On the other hand, an overbroad statute notifies
the actor that he is subject to criminal arrest, but deters the exercise of protected rights by
punishing specific conduct which is constitutionally protected. Statutory schemes which punish
protected conduct as well as unprotected conduct also fail for overbreadth. See Note, Judicial
Rewriting of Overbroad Statutes: Protectingthe Freedom of Association From Scales to Robel,
57 CALIF. L. REv.240, n.l (1969).
8. Accord, Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (statute requiring teachers to file
annually an affidavit listing all organizations to which they belonged in the last 5 years went "far
beyond" the state's interest in determining the competency of its teachers). See Bates v. City of
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (license tax requiring the disclosure of all members of the
NAACP chapter operating within the city deterred the right of private association); Louisiana
ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961) (the filing of an annual affidavit disclosing
members of the Communist Party deterred free association when applied to the officers of
NAACP); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigative Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (investigation
of communist infiltration in racial organizations did not justify investigation of NAACP
membership rolls); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (lawyer's association with NAACP
not subject to regulation on pretense of bar rule preventing business solicitation).
9. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
10. Alabama asked to inspect the membership rolls of the NAACP to determine if the
association had violated a statute requiring the registration of foreign corporations. The Court
ruled that the state interest in obtaining the information was insufficient to justify the "deterrent
effect" such disclosures would have on the free exercise by NAACP members of their protected
right of association. The Court noted that involuntary exposure could subject the members of
unpopular groups to social ostracism or even physical reprisals by hostile members of the
community and that a "deterrent effect" resulted when the possibility of exposure restrained an
individual from exercising his first amendment rights.
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interest may investigate associational activities." However, in
Dombrowski v. Pfister,12 the Court stated that even when
circumstances warrant investigation of an individual's associational
activities, it would apply the deterrent concept to prohibit regulation

which could be used to intimidate individuals by threatening
prosecution without any expectation of securing valid convictions.
Furthermore, in Scales v. United States, 3 the Court limited the scope
of regulation to individuals who actively and specifically intend to

further an unlawful objective of an organization. Finally, in United
States v. Robel," the Court concluded that any statutory scheme which

interferes with an individual's first amendment rights must be narrowly
drawn to exclude constitutionally protected activities.
In the instant case, after disposing of a procedural matter,

5

the

Superior Court reasoned that although New Jersey officials had a
legitimate interest in maintaining civil peace, approval of the reporting
system depended upon the system's possible effects on the right of
ordinary citizens to demonstrate their opposition to governmental
policy. The court then examined the nature of the information solicited

by the report forms and concluded that the forms went too far in
attempting to achieve a legitimate governmental goal. The court

acknowledged that while the files might facilitate the apprehension of
some protestors whose activities were related to unlawful occurrences,

many individuals would be reluctant to participate in any kind of
public political expression because of a desire not to have such activity
recorded. 8 More importantly, the forms were not restricted to
11. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Communist Party
of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); see Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
12. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). A Louisiana Un-American Activities Committee intimidated a
civil rights group by threatening to prosecute them under'the Louisiana Subversive Activities and
Communist Control Act.
13. 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (an individual's association with the Communist Party did not
warrant regulation unless the individual was an active member with the specific intent of
furthering the Party's subversive activities). See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500
(1964); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
14. 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (statute proscribing members of the Communist Party from
working in a defense facility invalidated since it infringed upon the freedom of association).
15. Although the defendant challenged plaintiff's standing to bring the suit, the Superior
Court ruled that under New Jersey precedent an individual did not have to violate the law before
seeking relief as to the applicability of a statute. More importantly, the court noted that the
United States Supreme Court generally relaxes standards of justiciability when governmental
action inhibits the exercise of first amendment rights. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479 (1965).
16. The court reasoned that the forms had a deterent effect because in addition to recording
the individual participant, the subject's family, friends, and employer would also be included in
the central files.
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specifically defined conduct and might be used to intimidate local
political troublemakers. Consequently, the court concluded that the
intelligence system was inherently dangerous because it tended to
restrict lawful advocacy of social and political change and ruled that
the completion, maintenance, and distribution of the forms violated the
.first amendment. The court then ordered the Attorney General to
rescind the directive establishing the reporting system 17 and to produce
and destroy all forms and files except those which contained
information which would be used to charge persons with specifically
defined criminal conduct.
The New Jersey reporting scheme opens to scrutiny a phase of
surveillance which the judiciary has had little opportunity to review:
that is, the extent to which authorities can compile data information.,8
Moreover, if the present decision is to have value as precedent, future
courts must recognize arguments not articulated in the Superior
Court's opinion. The facts that observation is a method of regulating
activity and surveillance is a valuable means of deterring unlawful
conduct support the conclusion that the reporting system has a
deterrent oh the exercise of associational activity."9 More importantly,
the purpose of surveillance should be the accumulation of data in order
to present evidence in prosecution, or to continue investigation by
conventional techniques such as search, seizure, and interrogation.
Consequently, investigation of public activity and compilation of
information concerning individual participants serve no legitimate law
enforcement objective in the absence of probable cause that the conduct
is criminal and a substantial likelihood of prosecution. 0 Therefore,
under the Robel decision, the New Jersey system was unconstitutional
17. See note I supra.
18. The Supreme Court has reviewed data collection by surreptitious eavesdropping,
searches and seizures, and lie detector tests because the collected information has been used for
prosecution. On the other hand, there is little opportunity for judicial review of the legitimate
limits of information storing when prosecution proceedings are not initiated. See Katz v, United

States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Sehmerber v,
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).

19.

Studies by leading social scientists clearly indicate that observation exerts a restrictive

influence on the freedom of human behavior and inhibits the incentive to express new or
challenging ideas. Consequently, surveillance should be confined to specifically defined unlawful

activities in order to minimize the danger of inhibiting the free exchange of ideas necessary for
democratic society. For this reason, surveillance is an undesirable technique to investigate political
protest. See Westin, supra note 4, at 1045, 1223.
20. Indeed, criminal investigation is conducted to ascertain the existence of a crime or to

identify a criminal and the collection of information by legislative investigative committees is
limited to data substantially related to the problem to be corrected. See Scigliano, The Grand
Jury, The Information, and The JudicialInquiry, 38 ORE. L. REv. 303 (1959).
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because it not only categorized and reported lawful forms of protest

as "civil disorders," but also authorized investigation of individuals
who engaged in these constitutionally protected activities. 21 In
concluding that the system violated the first amendment, the decision
is therefore correct. Eliminating the system, however, while logical,

merely prohibits a formalized reporting scheme. New Jersey police are
still free to make ad hoc investigative decisions, and the power of police
to maintain dossiers continues to be discretionary with local
departments. Authorities, therefore, have retained the power to collect

data on individuals who engage in perfectly lawful public conduct and
can still intimidate those who maintain views that are unpopular or
embarrassing to the investigative authorities. 22 This unlimited

jurisdiction not only conflicts with the concept of public privacy,23 but
also with Supreme Court decisions establishing the right to control the

knowledge and disclosure of an individual's associational activities. 24

The problem is further compounded since persons outside the law
enforcement agencies often obtain and abuse police files.2 5

Consequently, an unregulated authority to store information
concerning private activities can have the same deterrent effect as the

instant central intelligence system that was held unconsti.tutional. On
the other hand, a total prohibition of data collection would make
21. The "civil disorders" included constitutionally protected activity such as marches,
rallies, and demonstrations. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
22. Police discretion is especially critical because investigation of political activity many
times is used to harass individuals who have unconventional views rather than to lead to criminal
prosecution. See Editorial Note, Police Undercover Agents: New Threats to First Amendment

Freedoms, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 634, 660, 664 (1969); Note, The Legitimate Scope of Police
Discretion to Restrict Ordinary Public Activity, 4 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 233,
341 (1969); Note, Riot Control and the Fourth Amendment, 81 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1968).
23. An individual in a public place knows he is being observed but, unless he is a celebrity,
he does not expect to be identified. Knowledge or fear that an individual is under systematic
observation or that his actions and opinions are recorded destroys the sense of freedom men expect
and seek il public places. See Westin, supra note 4, at 1021. Indeed, the concept of recording
activities and compiling information on individuals is contrary to democratic principles. See
Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation Against Political Freedom, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 4
(1961). A statement by Mr. Justice Douglas is appropriate: "If [an individual's] every association
is known and recorded, if the conversations with his associates are purloined, who can say he
enjoys freedom of association. When such conditions obtain, our citizens will be afraid to utter
any but the safest and most orthodox thoughts; afraid to associate with any but the most
acceptable people. Freedom as the Constitution envisages it will have vanished." Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323, 354 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
24. See cases cited notes 8 &9 supra.
25. See Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored
PersonalData, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.342, 365-71 (1966).
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routine law enforcement unmanageable and, in time of crisis, there is

perhaps justification for temporary reporting schemes."6 Furthermore,
the daily functioning of governmental and law enforcement agencies

increasingly depends upon the availability of data concerning certain
individuals.27 In light of these requirements, the Superior Court's
decision to abolish the system without further explanation does not

assist police authorities and legislators in striking a balance between the
legitimate requirements of law enforcement and the individual's

constitutional right to privacy.
Criminal Law- Discovery- Witness's Deposition Held
Admissible When Witness Legally Unavailable Through Claim of
Privilege
Appealing from his conviction for the illegal sale of drugs,' the
defendant challenged the trial court's refusal to admit a defense

witness's deposition after the witness refused to testify at the trial. The
witness, who was arrested with defendant, 2 exercised her fifth

amendment right to avoid testifying at the trial, but her deposition
indicated that it was she and not the defendant who made the illegal
sale. The defendant argued that the state statute3 governing the use of
26. Indeed, the Kerner Commission recognized the need to remedy the lack of adequate
information concerning riot developments. In defending the New Jersey system, the Attorney
General stressed this point. The Commission, however, urged the "development" of an adequate
intelligence system to be used in the context of controlling disorders which had escalated beyond
the immediate police capabilities. Furthermore, the Committee envisioned an intelligence system
which would not survey individuals but would dispel rumors that could distort events and increase
confusion. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 173, 267, 269
(1968).
27. See generally Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New
Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REP. 1091 (1969); N.Y. Times,
Nov. 8, 1969, at 1,col. 5.
1. State v. Yates (St. Louis Cir. Ct. Sept. 28, 1967) (opinion not reported).
2. The witness was living on the premises where the sale took place. The evening prior to
petitioner's arrest an undercover police officer purchased drugs from the witness after asking to
buy them from petitioner. Petitioner, who was not there on this occasion, was present the
following night when the officer made the purchase culminating in petitioner's arrest. The witness
was arrested for making the sale on the previous evening.
3. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 492.400(2) (Supp. 1968-69) provides: "The facts which would
authorize the reading of the deposition may be established by the testimony of the deposing
witness or the certificate of the officer taking the deposition or the testimony of the person or
officer who attempted to serve the witness with a subpoena (I) If the witness resides or is gone
out of the state; (2) If he is dead; (3) If by reason of age, sickness or bodily infirmity he is unable
to or cannot safely attend court; (4) If he resides in a county other than that in which the trial is
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depositions provided for their admissibility in a criminal proceeding in
which the deponent made himself legally unavailable to testify under a
claim of privilege. The state contended, however, that the statute did
not expressly provide for the use of depositions in these circumstances
and that such a use could not be implied from its provisions. On appeal
to the Supreme Court of Missouri, held, reversed. When a witness
makes his direct testimony legally unavailable by invoking the selfincrimination clause of the fifth amendment, his deposition may be
admissible as evidence. State v. Yates, 442 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. 1969).
A majority of states have "unavailability" statutes4 that specify
the situations in which the witness is unavailable so as to render his
former testimony or deposition admissible at trial.5 Although the
language of these statutes implies that physical unavailability is
required,6 most courts facing this question have liberally construed
them to include the legal unavailability of a witness. 7 This is especially
true as to former testimony in both civil and criminal trials.8 There are,
held, or if he has gone a greater distance than forty miles from the place of trial without the
consent, connivance or collusion of the party requiring his testimony; (5) If he is a judge of a
court of record, a practicing attorney or physician and engaged in the discharge of his official or
professional duty at the time of the trial; (6) If the witness is absent without the consent,
connivance or collusion of the party requiring his testimony and the party, in the exercise of due
diligence, has been unable to procure the attendance of the deponent by subpoena."
4. The equivalent unavailability rule in federal courts is FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(3) which
provides: "The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for
any purpose if the court finds: I, that the witness is dead; or 2, that the witness is at a greater
distance than 100 miles from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the United States, unless
it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; or
3, that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment; or 4, that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the
attendance of the witness by subpoena; or 5, upon application and notice, that such exceptional
circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the
importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition
to be used." This rule is very similar to typical state statutes such as Missouri's except for the
broad scope afforded by subsection 5 which will allow the judge to permit testimony of a legally
unavailable witness to be introduced into evidence.
5. Death is the most widely recognized example. Other common examples recognized in
different states include absence from the jurisdiction, inability to find the witness, illness, senility,
insanity, and imprisonment. See generally5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1403-13 (3d ed. 1940).
6. At early English common law the witness had to be physically unavailable; however, the
chancery courts did not confine themselves to so narrow an area and permitted use of hearsay
evidence when the witness was legally unavailable. 2 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 138 (1954).
7. See generally Note, Declarations Against Interest: A Critical Review of the
Unavailability Requirement, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 301 (1967); Comment, Evidence- Whether
Witness' Prior Voluntary Testimoni Constitutes Waiver of Privilege of Self-Incrimination in
Second Trial of Same Case. 73 DICK. L. REV. 80, 94-99 (1968).
8. See. e.g., Mason v. United States, 408 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1969); Wyatt v. State, 35
Ala. App. 147, 46 So. 2d 837 (1950); Woodward v. State, 21 Ala. App. 417, 109 So. 119 (1926);
People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599, 441 P.2d 111 (1968) (rev'd on other grounds); Johnson v.
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however, few cases dealing with admissibility of a deposition and all
are civil actions.' In a leading case, the Supreme Court of Missouri
held a sworn affidavit to be admissible following a witness's refusal to
testify under claim of privilege. 0 More recently, New Jersey reached a

similar result when unsigned statements made to city health officers
were admitted following the declarant's exercise of his right against

self-incrimination." The court noted that "there is a vital need for a
provision [providing for admissibility of depositions where a wifness is
legally unavailable] to prevent miscarriage of justice resulting from the
arbitrary exclusion of evidence which is worthy of consideration, when
it is the best evidence available.'

2

The court in the present case based its decision on the Missouri
"unavailability" statute, 3 which lists the criteria for admitting a
deposition or former testimony into evidence when a witness is
unavailable. By invoking the fifth amendment and making her
testimony legally unavailable, the court found that the witness was just
as unavailable as if she were dead or had gone out of the state. 4 The
court further stated that when a witness is thus "unavailable," there
People, 152 Colo. 586, 384 P.2d 454 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 922 (1964); Habig v. Bastian,
117 Fla. 864, 158 So. 508 (1935); State v. Terry, 202 Kan. 599, 451 P.2d 211 (1969); State v.
Stewart, 85 Kan. 404, 116 P. 489 (1911); People v. Pickett, 339 Mich. 294, 63 N.W.2d 681 (1954),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 937 (1955); Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 237 SW.2d 210 (St.
Louis App. 1951); Travellers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Wright, 322 P.2d 417 (Okla. 1958); State v. Rawls,
451 P.2d 127 (Ore. 1969). Contra, People v. Lawrence, 168 Cal. App. 2d 510, 336 P.2d 189
(1959); Hayward v. Barron, 38 N.H. 366 (1858); Commonwealth v. Turner, 389 Pa. 239, 133
A.2d 187 (1957).
9. One of these cases is of doubtful value because of a later pronouncement by the same
court. Wells v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 187 Pa. 166, 40 A. 802 (1898) (deposition or
doctor held admissible when he became legally incompetent to testify because of enactment or
state statute). But see Commonwealth v. Turner, 389 Pa. 239, 133 A.2d 187 (1957) (former
testimony of witness who recanted sought to be introduced on grounds that he was an unavailable
witness held inadmissible).
10. Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945). The court relied primarily
upon Wigmore's "Necessity Principle," which states that "[w]henever a witness is practically
unavailable his statements should be received." 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1456 (3d ed. 1940).
When the statement sought to be admitted has been verified under oath and subjected to crossexamination, there is more reason to admit it.
II. Band's Refuse Removal, Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn, 62 N.J. Super. 522, 163 A.2d
465 (1960).
12. Id. at 559, 163 A.2d at 485, citing COMMENTS, REPORT OF THE COMM.ON THE REVISION
OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY, Rule 63(4)(c) (1955).
13. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 492.400 (Supp. 1968-69).
14. It would appear easier to hold a witness legally absent under Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 492.400(2)(6) (Supp. 1968-69) than to construe the statute to generally include legal
unavailability as falling within it. It is interesting to note that the court has chosen not to do
this but to follow other courts in declaring legal unavailability to be something akin to being dead
or absent from the state.
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may be a need to resort to testimony from a secondary source as a
matter of necessity in order that the defendant might be accorded a fair
trial. In reaching its decision, the court analogized to State v. Stewart, 5
which ruled on the admissibility of former testimony as opposed to a
deposition. In Stewart Jhe court stated that the admissibility of former
testimony did not depend so much on the presence or availability of
the witness a§ it did on the availability of his direct testimony. In
reaching this conclusion, the Stewart court reasoned that since former
testimony may be used when a witness is outside the jurisdiction,
acquires an interest, or performs other acts that would disqualify him,
he should not be allowed to defeat the use of the same testimony by
claiming a statutory privilege when called to the witness stand.
This decision marks the first time that a deposition has been
admitted in a criminal trial when the witness was physically present but
refused to testify on grounds of self-incrimination. The court has thus
expanded the use of a deposition in criminal trials and put it on a par
with the use of former testimony."6 In applying what is essentially a
statutory exception to the hearsay rule, however, the court faces a
peculiar dilemma. If the court permits the witness's deposition to be
introduced, it deprives the jury.of the chance to observe the witness's
demeanor and introduces an added element of uncertainty to the
evidence. If the court refuses to admit the deposition, the defendant
may be deprived of the witness's testimony in any form. This problem
becomes especially acute in a criminal proceeding in which the
defendant should be accorded eery benefit of the doubt. To resolve the
competing values in such a situation, a court should, perhaps, consider
the following alternatives. First, the witness could be required to testify
under threat of contempt as to statements already given. A person who
has previously waived his fifth amendment privilege should not be
permitted to reassert it as to statements already given and which can
be used against him regardless of his present testimony. On the other
hand, if for some reason the witness's deposition would not be
admissible against him, subsequent testimony as to those-same
statements should be inadmissible against him for the same reason.
15. 85 Kan. 404, 116 P.489 (1911).
16. Although in theory there should be no distinction between a deposition under oath
subject to cross-examination and former testimony, this has not been the case in practice. At
common law, depositions were unknown, and even today there is no criminal pretrial discovery
unless provided for by statute. This possibly is the reason that former testimony has had a
-heretofore broader use than depositions. In any event, both are sworn statements and, when
subjected to cross-examination, should be treated equally.
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Thus a court should require a witness to testify when it determines that
it would be impossible for a witness to further incriminate himself by
testifying about prior statements. Applying this rule, the ends of justice
would be better served for all; the opportunity to observe the witness's
demeanor and cross-examination would be preserved, and, at the same
time, the witness would be protected from giving any new evidence
against himself. The deposition would thus be used only as a last resort
in the interests of obtaining justice. Secondly, in a situation where the
court must resort to a deposition, only those statements that are
favorable to defendant should be admitted into evidence. This is to say
that it is unfair to the defendant to admit adverse statements that have
not been given in a prior judicial proceeding in which the witness could
fully recognize the serious import of his statements. Admission of
unfavorable statements from a deposition may be further challenged on
the grounds that the defendant has not received all possible protection
due him and that his right of confrontation has been violated. Although
most courts hold that a defendant is adequately protected by the
opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the taking of the
deposition, this argument overlooks the obvious difference between a
deposition taken before a small audience and testimony given in the
solemn atmosphere of a courtroom. A witness is far more likely to give
unsubstantiated, incriminating evidence in a deposition proceeding
where he knows most of the parties present than in the impersonal
arena of a courtroom where all eyes are on him.

